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SUMMARY
This thesis develops methods that leverage electromagnetic (EM) side-chan-
nel signals for non-adversarial and non-intrusive monitoring of embed-
ded and cyber-physical systems, and provides techniques for identifying
anomalous/malicious program behavior by detecting deviations in EM em-
anations, and presents a framework for end-to-end basic-block program
execution tracking by monitoring the device’s EM side-channel signal.
Side-channels cause unintentional information leakage as a side-effect
of hardware activity. While attackers have traditionally exploited side-
channel analysis for extracting sensitive information from target systems,
recent research has utilized side-channels for non-adversarial monitoring
of program execution. Such monitoring can be especially useful for secur-
ing resource-constrained security-critical embedded systems.
Various approaches have been proposed in the literature to leverage
side-channels for anomaly-based intrusion/malware detection, software
profiling, program/code execution tracking, instruction execution model-
ing, etc. The main drawbacks of the existing approaches are that 1) they
are coarse-grained and cannot detect tiny deviations caused by stealthy at-
tacks, 2) they do not scale well for monitoring more complex devices (e.g.,
devices with faster processors and operating systems), and 3) they do not
provide end-to-end detailed program execution monitoring/tracking. As
such, these approaches can be ineffective in many practical scenarios.
xiv
To successfully leverage side-channels for protecting embedded and
cyber-physical systems through non-adversarial and non-intrusive mon-
itoring, our research has 1) designed an intrusion detection system that
learns a dictionary of reference EM signatures and exploits the dictionary
for identifying anomalous/malicious program behavior, 2) designed neural
network to model the monitored device’s EM side-channel signal and de-
tect stealthy malware activities through deviations in EM emanations, 3)
designed a novel framework that performs basic-block program execution
tracing by monitoring the device’s EM side-channel signal, and 4) demon-
strated that even a single instruction deviation in program execution can
be detected with high accuracy via EM side-channel signals captured by
a readily available measurement device. The work provides a deep under-
standing of side-channel analysis for program activity monitoring and can





A side-channel is an unintentional communication channel that causes
information leakage as a side-effect of executing a legitimate program on
the hardware of a computing system [1]. As hardware activity depends on
the executed program, the resulting side-channel can reveal information
about the program activity. As such, attackers can extract sensitive in-
formation by monitoring and analyzing side-channel signals from a target
device.
Side-channel attacks pose a serious security threat for many crypto-
graphic implementations. Attackers have exploited analog side-channel
signals such as power consumption (i.e., power side-channel) [2], unin-
tentional electromagnetic emanations (i.e., EM side-channel) [3, 4] and
even acoustic emissions (i.e., acoustic side-channel) [5] to extract sensi-
tive information from victim systems. While side-channels are tradition-
ally used for cryptanalysis, the information leakage by side-channels can
be leveraged for securing systems through non-adversarial program exe-
cution monitoring. For instance, power fingerprinting [6] leverages power
side-channel signals for integrity assessment of software-defined radios.
Likewise, works in [7, 8] use EM side-channel signals for hardware Trojan
detection.
Embedded and cyber-physical systems (CPSs) have become ubiquitous
and can impact every aspect of our daily lives. Furthermore, embedded
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and CPSs are prevalent in many high-assurance systems, including med-
ical devices such as cardiac pacemakers and insulin pumps [9], nuclear
power generation, military systems, transportation systems, autonomous
and unmanned vehicles, communication satellites, etc. [10]. These em-
bedded devices collect sensor data, perform data processing and real-time
analytics, control actuators, and even execute artificial intelligence (AI)
tasks. Experts estimate that in 2019, there were more than 26 billion
connected embedded devices worldwide [11]. Furthermore, embedded sys-
tems are experiencing exponential growth and are expected to be a USD
6.2 trillion market globally by 2025 [12], with more than 75 billion active
devices worldwide [11].
Unfortunately, due to security vulnerabilities such as weak security
systems, insecure network services, and lack of security updates, many
connected embedded devices are exposed to remote attacks that can cause
severe physical and financial damages [13]. Attackers have already tar-
geted different embedded and CPSs including industrial control system
[14], smart grid system [15], and embedded medical devices [16]. Further-
more, in 2016, the infamous Mirai botnet [17] compromised more than
600,000 embedded devices (mostly IP cameras and routers) worldwide and
crippled many high profile web services via a massive distributed denial of
service (DDoS) attack. A comprehensive review of attacks on embedded
and CPSs can be found in [18].
The security of embedded devices is a serious concern, and there is
a growing need for embedded device monitoring. Securing embedded de-
vices can be a challenging task since CPSs are often severely constrained
by limited resources, power, and cost. Unfortunately, the state of the art
malware detection techniques such as malware signatures [19, 20], sand-
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boxing [21, 22], hardware support [23, 24, 25, 26], machine learning [27,
28], and dynamic analysis [29, 30, 31] require substantial computational
power. As such, existing security solutions are not feasible due to their
overhead to the system. In addition, many CPSs use customized and pro-
prietary software and hardware, and thus, are difficult to update or up-
grade. Furthermore, attackers may be able to control the victim device
and may disable the internal monitoring system. Therefore, an isolation
between the monitored device and the monitoring system is preferable,
especially for security-critical high-assurance systems.
A possible solution for these issues is non-adversarial monitoring of
embedded and CPSs through side-channel signal analysis. Side-channel
based monitoring does not require any resource or infrastructure on, or
any modifications to, the monitored system itself, and thus, does not re-
quire any update or upgrade of system software or hardware. As such,
this approach is especially suitable for monitoring resource-constrained
security-critical embedded devices. Furthermore, side-channel-based mon-
itoring is completely external and non-intrusive. Thus, the deployment of
such monitoring systems is relatively simple and does not pose any con-
cern for the disruption of services. Additionally, this approach provides
isolation between the monitored system and the monitoring system, and
thus, protects the monitoring system from any attack on the monitored
system.
Due to these advantages, researchers have recently leveraged both power
and EM side-channels for non-adversarial hardware/software activity mon-
itoring. For instance, researchers exploited side-channel signal analysis
for anomaly-based intrusion/malware detection to protect embedded de-
vices from malicious attacks [32, 33, 34]. However, these approaches are
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either coarse-grained detection frameworks which are unable to detect
small changes caused by a stealthy malware (e.g., [33]) or require mal-
ware signature to achieve a high detection rate (e.g., [32]) or do not scale
well with the complexity of the device (e.g., [34]).
In addition to anomaly detection, researchers exploited side-channel
signals for zero-overhead software profiling [35], loop-level program activ-
ity monitoring [36], and for recognizing a sequence of instructions [37].
Although program profiling is useful for path execution counting, effec-
tive monitoring of security-critical devices requires an end-to-end detailed
(e.g., basic-block-granularity) program execution tracing. Furthermore,
there is very little intuition about the limits of side-channel analysis (e.g.,
whether a single instruction deviation can be successfully detected), and
how these limits are affected by the monitored signal quality (e.g., SNR
and bandwidth).
These shortcomings demonstrate that new approaches are required for
side-channel-based intrusion/malware detection systems that can detect
even stealthy attacks with high accuracy and low detection latency. Fur-
thermore, such detection systems must be effective for monitoring differ-
ent embedded devices, including devices with faster/complex processors
that run on operating systems. Apart from anomaly detection, there is
also a dire need for monitoring systems that can leverage side-channel
signals for detailed (basic-block granularity) program execution tracing.
Such monitoring systems can ensure the embedded system’s integrity and
security, and would also be useful for embedded device testing, fault di-
agnostics and debugging, performance analysis and code optimization,
and digital forensics. Furthermore, to successfully implement any side-
channel-based monitoring system, we must systematically investigate and
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understand the empirical/practical limits of side-channel analysis, and
evaluate the impacts of signal quality (e.g., signal-to-noise ratio and signal
bandwidth) on the monitoring capability.
While both power and EM side-channels can be exploited for program
execution monitoring, unlike power, EM side-channel does not require
physical access to the system. In addition, EM side-channel often pro-
vides higher signal bandwidth. Thus, EM side-channel is preferable in
scenarios where (1) physical access to the system is not available (due
to packaging), and (2) detailed monitoring of faster devices is required. As
such, throughout this thesis, we focus on EM side-channels. The following
sections summarize the contributions of the thesis.
1.2 Intrusion Detection through Electromagnetic Signal Analysis
Side-channel analysis is traditionally exploited for unauthorized eaves-
dropping. However, it is possible to utilize side-channels for securing
computing systems through non-adversarial and non-intrusive monitor-
ing. In that regard, researchers have proposed several approaches to mon-
itor hand-held mobile device’s power fluctuations to detect computation-
intensive malicious activities [38, 39, 40, 41]. For instance, VirusMe-
ter [40] monitored battery usage to identify “long-term” mobile malware.
Likewise, [39] correlated power signatures to detect energy-greedy mal-
ware. While these approaches can identify computation-intensive attacks
that drain the device’s battery, they are ineffective against stealthy at-
tacks. Furthermore, Power Fingerprinting (PFP) [6] leveraged power side-
channels for integrity assessment of software-defined radios. PFP corre-
lated the processor’s power consumption with stored trusted power sig-
natures to identify deviations in execution. However, this approach was
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not effective for monitoring more complex devices (e.g., devices with faster
processors and operating systems). In contrast, WattsUpDoc [32] used
supervised learning (i.e., K-nearest neighbors, multilayer perceptron, and
random forests) to identify malicious activity in embedded medical devices.
It extracted statistical features along with spectral (i.e., frequency domain)
features from real-time dynamic power consumption for malware detec-
tion. However, it required training with malware signatures and thus was
not effective against zero-day attacks (i.e., new/unknown malware).
In addition, researchers have exploited unintentional electromagnetic
emanations (i.e., EM side-channel) for non-intrusive and contactless mon-
itoring of embedded devices. Sehatbakhsh et al. [36] observed that repet-
itive program activities (e.g., loops) emanate periodic EM emanations and
can be detected as spectral peaks or spikes on the EM spectrogram. Spec-
tral Profiling [36] exploited these spectral spikes for “loop-level” program
profiling. EDDIE [33] further extended Spectral Profiling to identify tiny
intrusions/deviations inside loops using Kolmogorov-Smirnov (KS) test.
However, EDDIE could only detect much larger (>500,000 instructions)
deviations outside of the loops. In contrast, Han et al. [34] analyzed the
EM spectrogram using a long short-term memory (LSTM) network to iden-
tify malicious activity on programmable logic controllers (PLCs). However,
[34] does not scale well for more complex devices, such as those with faster
processors and operating systems.
More importantly, the signal spectrogram is estimated using the short-
time Fourier transform (STFT). However, STFT implicitly assumes that the
underlying signal is periodic within each fast Fourier transform (FFT) win-
dow. While this assumption is reasonable for program loops, it does not
hold for non-loop program activities. This non-periodicity often leads to
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unintended artifacts in the signal spectrogram. Consequently, EM spec-
trogram analysis often struggles to identify tiny deviations outside program
loops. Furthermore, to identify minute shifts in spectral peaks, spec-
trogram analysis requires high spectral (i.e., frequency-domain) resolu-
tion. However, the higher spectral resolution requires larger FFT windows,
which, in turn, leads to higher detection latency.
To address these issues, in Chapter 3, we present IDEA (Intrusion De-
tection through Electromagnetic signal Analysis), a novel framework that
leverages EM side-channel signals for anomaly-based intrusion detection.
IDEA is effective against stealthy attacks and can identify tiny deviations in
EM side-channel signals, both inside and outside the program loops. For
this, IDEA analyzes the monitored device’s EM signatures in time-domain
(instead of EM spectrogram or frequency domain signatures) and com-
pares them to trusted reference EM signatures. The first step in IDEA is to
record EM emanations from an uncompromised reference device to create
a baseline dictionary of signal fragments that correspond to the normal
behavior of the device. IDEA also exploits clustering to reduce the num-
ber of dictionary entries for efficient computing. IDEA then continuously
monitors the target device’s EM emanations, comparing the observed EM
emanations against the baseline dictionary. When no malware is present,
the device’s EM emanations match the entries in the baseline dictionary
well. If, however, the observed EM emanations deviate significantly from
the entries in the baseline dictionary, IDEA reports this as an anomaly,
which is potentially caused by malware. Finally, we demonstrate with
experimental evaluations that IDEA is effective against different malware
behavior such as DDoS and Ransomware, and can monitor different de-
vices, including FPGAs, IoTs, and CPSs with high detection accuracy (AUC
7
>99.5%), from up to 3 m distances.
1.3 Malware Detection using Neural Network Model for Electromag-
netic Side-Channel Signals
Information leakage through side-channels is a severe security threat. In-
terestingly, side-channels can also be leveraged for protecting resource-
constrained embedded devices through non-adversarial and non-intrusive
hardware/software activity monitoring. In Chapter 3, we have presented
IDEA - an intrusion detection framework that exploits the device’s EM
signatures to identify anomalous device activity. IDEA uses a reference
dictionary of trusted EM patterns to verify EM emanations from the mon-
itored device to detect intrusion. Experimental evaluations demonstrated
that IDEA can detect stealthy attacks on different embedded systems with
excellent accuracy. However, a concern with this approach is its scala-
bility; i.e., the reference dictionary may grow prohibitively large for larger
applications. Specifically, computational time and space requirements for
IDEA increases linearly with the number of dictionary entries. While IDEA
exploits clustering to reduce the number of dictionary entries, for large
applications, IDEA can still become computationally inefficient.
To overcome this issue, in Chapter 4, we present a novel malware de-
tection system that leverages neural network models for EM side-channel
signals to identify deviations in program execution. A neural network can
approximate complicated functions by adjusting its network parameters
(i.e., weights and biases) through training. Consequently, a neural net-
work does not require to explicitly store/memorize the reference EM signa-
tures, and thus, removes the necessity for the reference dictionary. While
the training phase can be time-consuming, the inference or prediction by a
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neural network is straightforward and computationally efficient. For mal-
ware detection, we first train a neural network with EM emanations from
an uncompromised reference device to model the device’s baseline EM sig-
natures. Next, we use this signal model to monitor an unverified target
device. Any deviation in the device’s activity causes variations in its EM
fingerprints, which, in turn, violates the trained model. We identify and
report this as an anomalous/malicious device activity. Experimental eval-
uations reveal that the system can effectively monitor different embedded
devices (e.g., FPGAs, IoTs, and CPSs) and detect even stealthy malware at-
tacks (e.g., 5 µs long attack) with excellent detection accuracy (AUC ≈ 0.99)
and low detection latency (≈ 20 µs). Furthermore, in our experiments, this
system was roughly 35 times faster and 375 times space/memory efficient
than that of IDEA.
1.4 Program Tracing through Electromagnetic Side-Channel Signal
Analysis
Program tracing is a dynamic program analysis that records the execution
path for detailed program activity monitoring. Such traces are commonly
used for software testing [42], fault diagnostics and debugging [43], per-
formance analysis and code optimization [44], digital forensics, etc. In
addition, program tracking can ensure system integrity and security.
Typically, program tracing is implemented using software instrumenta-
tion that records runtime events. However, this adds high (typically 50%
[45]) overhead to the program execution. Thus, software instrumentation
is not suitable for resource-constrained embedded devices.
An alternative approach is to monitor resource-constrained embedded
devices via side-channel analysis. For instance, Spectral Profiling [36] ex-
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ploits EM side-channel signals to identify program loops and performs
loop-level program profiling. Likewise, zero-overhead profiling [35] corre-
lates EM signals with acyclic program paths to provide execution counts
for such paths. Similarly, [46] envisions program hot paths as Markov
states and exploits short-time Fourier transform (STFT) of EM signal for
program profiling. While loop identification/verification and path execu-
tion counts are useful in many applications, effective device monitoring
requires end-to-end basic-block-granularity execution tracking. In addi-
tion, [37] recovers the most likely executed instruction sequence by model-
ing the code execution and its power consumption using a hidden Markov
model (HMM). Likewise, [47] modeled instruction execution and performed
instruction sequence tracking via EM side-channel signal. However, for
faster devices, instruction-level modeling requires prohibitively high moni-
toring bandwidth (e.g., at least a few GHz sampling rate for monitoring a 1
GHz processor). Moreover, single instruction modeling ignores the effects
of instruction pipelines. Thus, this approach may not scale well for faster
and more complex devices (e.g., devices with operating systems).
To overcome these limitations, in Chapter 5, we present P-TESLA - Pro-
gram Tracing through Electromagnetic Side-channeL Analysis. P-TESLA
exploits the device’s electromagnetic (EM) emanations to reconstruct a de-
tailed (basic-block-level) program execution path with high accuracy. For
this, we use a two-step training process that leverages instrumented train-
ing to annotate the uninstrumented training signals and identify which
signal snippets correspond to which code segments. Next, we use a novel
signal matching technique that efficiently establishes a correspondence
between the test signal and the training signals, and use this signal corre-
spondence to reconstruct the program execution path. Finally, we demon-
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strate with empirical evaluations that P-TESLA can effectively monitor dif-
ferent embedded devices (e.g., FPGAs and IoTs) and reconstruct program
execution paths with high ( ≈ 99%) accuracy from up to 1 m distance.
1.5 Impacts of Signal Quality on Side-Channel Analysis
Side-channel signals have long been used in cryptanalysis and recently as
a means for non-adversarial and non-intrusive hardware/software activ-
ity monitoring. Both of these use-cases have seen steady improvement,
allowing ever-smaller deviations in program behavior to be monitored (to
track program behavior and identify anomalies) or exploited (to steal sen-
sitive information). However, there is very little intuition about the limits
of side-channel analysis (e.g., whether a single instruction deviation can
be accurately detected), and how these limits are affected by the monitored
signal quality (e.g., SNR and bandwidth).
In chapter 6, we use a popular open-source cryptographic software
package (an open-source implementation of the RSA public-key cryptosys-
tem) as a test subject to demonstrate that, with enough training data, wide
signal bandwidth, and high signal-to-noise ratio, even a single-instruction
deviation in program execution can be identified with very high accu-
racy. We additionally show that, in cryptographic implementations where
branch decisions contain information about the secret key, nearly all such
information can be extracted from EM side-channel signal. Finally, we an-
alyze how the received signal bandwidth, the amount of training, and the
signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) affect the accuracy of side-channel-based re-




The research contributions of the thesis are:
• IDEA, an intrusion detection framework that leverages EM side-channels
to protect embedded devices from stealthy attacks [48].
• A malware detection system that exploits neural network to model
device’s EM side-channel signals to identify anomalous/malicious de-
vice activity [49].
• P-TESLA, a framework for zero-overhead and non-intrusive program
execution tracing through EM side-channel signal analysis [50].
• A systemic investigation of practical limits of EM side-channel ana-
lysis, and evaluation of impacts of signal quality on side-channel
based program execution monitoring [51].
1.7 Thesis Outline
The rest of this thesis is organized as follows: Chapter 2 provides informa-
tion on side-channels, their use-cases - including traditional side-channel
attacks and non-adversarial device monitoring, and topics related to EM
side-channel signal analysis. Chapter 3 presents IDEA - an intrusion de-
tection system that leverages EM side-channel signals for anomaly de-
tection. Chapter 4 introduces a malware detection system that exploits
neural network to identify deviations in EM side-channel signal due to
anomalous/malicious device activities. Chapter 5 proposes P-TESLA - a
framework that exploits EM side-channel analysis for program execution
tracing. Chapter 6 empirically evaluates the limits of EM side-channels for
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monitoring program execution. Finally, Chapter 7 summarizes the contri-




In this chapter, we provide some key concepts related to side-channels,
their use cases in attacks and non-adversarial monitoring, and approaches
related to side-channel signal monitoring and analysis that were heavily
exploited throughout the thesis.
2.1 Side-Channels
Computer systems are carefully designed to protect sensitive information
through different security protocols. These protocols ensure that access
to any information must be through a proper authorization. However, in
1967, Dr. Willis H. Ware [52] identified vulnerabilities of resource-sharing
computer networks that could lead to unintentional information leakage
to unauthorized parties. He demonstrated that hardware and software
activities in a computer system unintentionally creates undesired signals
or “side-channels” that may enable the attackers to bypass the security
protocols. In 1973, Lampson [1] exploited these “side-channels” to trans-
mit sensitive customer information to an unauthorized computer program.
His work demonstrated the issues related to information confinement in
a computing system and proposed a set of safeguards against such in-
formation leakage. Furthermore, Eck [53] decoded the electromagnetic
(EM) radiations from a video display unit to reconstruct the video content.
He claimed that such EM side-channel signals can be picked up and ex-
ploited for stealthy eavesdropping, even from distances over 1 kilometer.
In addition, Harold [54] noticed that unintentional EM emanations from
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processors, communication lines, and output devices caused information
leakage.
Moreover, the difference in execution time due to different control-flow
branch execution (e.g., conditional statements) can also cause information
leakage. Kocher [55] demonstrated such timing attacks to break different
cryptosystems (e.g., RSA and DSS). In addition, Schindler [56] exploited
timing attacks to compromise the secret keys of RSA with the Chinese re-
mainder theorem. However, these attacks were performed on simple com-
puting devices and required direct/physical access to the system. Bonech
et al. [57] demonstrated remote timing attacks that broke secret keys of
OpenSSL, a cryptosystem commonly used in web servers and SSL appli-
cations, without any direct access to the system.
Furthermore, Kocher [2] proposed differential power analysis (DPA) that
exploited power side-channel signals for cryptanalysis. He demonstrated
the effectiveness of DPA by breaking various cryptosystems’ secret keys on
microcontrollers. He collected thousands of power traces to build a statis-
tical model to estimate the secret bits of cryptosystems. He claimed that
unanticipated security faults could lead to catastrophic consequences if
hardware designers failed or ignored to address the information leakage
through side-channels. Moreover, Goubin et al. [58] demonstrated that
DPA could circumvent the countermeasures against simple power analysis
(SPA) attacks. In addition, Messerges et al. [59] extracted secret exponent
bits from tamper-resistant hardware using DPA. To counteract these at-
tacks, researchers proposed several countermeasures. For instance, Chari
et al. [60] added randomness while performing key-dependent computa-
tions to prevent statistical attacks such as DPA. Likewise, Bayrak et al.
[61] identified and transformed sensitive instructions to minimize infor-
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mation leakage.
While side-channel attacks often targeted simple devices (e.g., smart
cards, simple embedded devices, etc.), researchers also demonstrated at-
tacks on more complex devices, such as smartphones [62, 4] and PCs [3,
63]. For instance, Genkin et al. monitored EM emanations from PCs using
a readily-available consumer-grade radio receiver and broke RSA encryp-
tion [3]. Likewise, Alam et al. [4] retrieved secret keys of RSA from mobile
phones using only a single EM measurement.
Moreover, even acoustic emissions and heat radiations or system tem-
peratures can unintentionally reveal sensitive information. Researchers
demonstrated that English words and texts can be reconstructed using
acoustic emanations from keyboards [64] and printers [65]. Similarly,
work in [5, 66] used acoustic side-channels to extract secret encryption
keys. In addition, temperature attacks, such as in [67, 68] correlated
circuit activities with heat radiation. Furthermore, Genkin et al. [69] ex-
ploited variations in chasis potential to break RSA cryptosystem.
Apart from analog/physical side-channels, attackers have also exploited
digital/micro-architectural variations in computer systems. For instance,
cache attacks monitor the victims’ cache access patterns in a shared phys-
ical system (e.g., in a virtualized environment) to extract secret information
such as encryption keys [70, 71, 72, 73].
Throughout this thesis, we focused on EM side-channels due to their
capability for non-intrusive, detailed, and remote/contact-less program
execution monitoring. In the next section, we briefly review EM side-
channels and their use cases.
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2.2 EM Side-Channels: Attacks and Non-Adversarial Use Cases
In 1985, Wim van Eck [53] published the first unclassified technical ana-
lysis of the security risks of EM emanations from electronic devices. Van
Eck eavesdropped on a computer system by picking up its monitor’s EM
emanations and successfully reconstructed the video content at a range
of hundreds of meters, using just $15 worth of equipment. His work
demonstrated that side-channel EM emanations are present in electronic
devices (e.g., keyboards, computer displays, printers, etc.) and can be
captured using proper equipment. This opened a new era for EM side-
channel attacks. Furthermore, [74] Gandolfi et al. revealed secret bits of
RSA and DES cryptosystems by exploiting EM side-channel signals from
CMOS chips and smart cards. They correlated the EM signals with the
secret keys and demonstrated that EM analysis can be as effective as
power analysis. Moreover, Agrawal et al. [75] showed that EM emana-
tions are consequences of current flows within circuits and electronic de-
vices and can cause information leakage due to the correlation between
the processed data and current flow. They also demonstrated that EM
side-channel attacks can circumvent power analysis countermeasures to
break cryptosystems. More recently, Alam et al. [4] retrieved secret keys of
OpenSSL’s fixed-window constant-time blinded RSA from mobile phones
using EM side-channel signal. They first identified the vulnerable part of
the program (i.e., the secret bit dependent computations) in the EM signal,
and then compared the signal patterns with the known training signals to
predict the secret bits with only a single measurement.
While EM side-channel analysis is traditionally exploited for unautho-
rized eavesdropping, it is possible to utilize side-channels for securing
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computing systems through non-adversarial monitoring. In that regard,
researchers have used EM side-channels for software profiling, malware
detection, program/code execution tracking, instruction modeling, etc.
Callan et al. [35] exploited EM side-channel signals for zero-overhead
program profiling that required no hardware or software modification or in-
strumentation. Zero Overhead Profiling (ZOP) [35] performed a depth-first
search (DFS) through the program’s control-flow graph (CFG) using EM
signatures to identify and count executions of acyclic control-flow paths.
Additionally, ZoP or similar graph-search-based profiling requires exten-
sive code coverage (i.e., a thorough set of inputs that execute all relevant
code segments or control-flow sub-paths in the training phase). Thus, Rut-
ledge et al. [76] proposed progressive symbolic execution (PSE) to address
the code coverage issues to further improve ZoP. In contrast, Sehatbakhsh
et al. [36] observed that repetitive program activity (e.g., loops) emanates
periodic EM signals and can be detected as spectral peaks or spikes on the
spectrogram of the signal. Spectral Profiling [36] exploited these spectral
spikes for loop identification and performed “loop-level” program profil-
ing. Similarly, [46] modeled program hot paths, such as loops, as Markov
states, and extracted short-time Fourier transform (STFT) features from
EM side-channel signals to perform program profiling. Moreover, Yilmaz
et al. [47] modeled instruction execution and performed instruction se-
quence tracking via EM side-channel signal. Work in [77] provides a de-
tailed review of side-channel-based code/program execution monitoring
systems.
EDDIE [33] further extended Spectral Profiling [36] to identify tiny in-
trusions/deviations inside loops. EDDIE noticed that any deviation in pro-
gram loops causes a spectral shift in the spectrogram and detected such
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spectral shifts using the Kolmogorov-Smirnov (KS) test. Similarly, Syn-
drome [78] exploited EM spectral analysis to protect embedded medical
devices against malicious attacks. Likewise, Han et al. [34] analyzed the
EM spectrogram using a long short-term memory (LSTM) network to iden-
tify malicious activity on programmable logic controllers (PLCs). Further-
more, REMOTE [79] demonstrated a malware detection system that was
robust to signal variations due to device-to-device variability such as shift
and drift in the device’s clock frequency. A detailed review of side-channel
based anomaly detection can be found in [80].
Furthermore, EMPROF [81] exploited EM emanations to detect last-
level cache (LLC) misses for memory profiling without any instrumentation.
EMPROF noticed that the processor stalls associated with the LLC misses
cause dips in the EM amplitude and identified these “dips” using moving
average filters. In addition, EMMA [82] leveraged electromagnetic side-
channel signals for embedded device attestations.
Apart from program execution monitoring, EM side-channels have been
exploited for hardware Trojan detection [7, 8] and for enhanced physi-
cal authentication [83]. Soll et al. [7] used localized EM measurements
to distinguish between malicious and genuine circuit designs on FPGAs.
Similarly, Balasch et al. exploited EM fingerprints to identify hardware
Trojans in FPGAs. In contrast, Nguyen et al. created a ‘backscattering
side-channel’ by transmitting high-frequency EM signals toward the IC
and monitored the backscattered (reflected) signal from the IC [84]. This
approach for non-destructive IC inspection using EM signals can be ef-
fective for hardware Trojan detection [85, 86] and counterfeit IC detection
[87]. In addition, Sakiyama et al. [83] demonstrated that EM emanations
from an FPGA device can be exploited as a physically unclonable function
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(PUF) for enhanced device authentication.
2.3 Electromagnetic Side-Channel Analysis
To efficiently analyze EM side-channels, we must first understand how
electromagnetic emanations are created by hardware activities and identify
program execution dependent variations in emanated EM signals.
2.3.1 Electromagnetic Emanations from Hardware Activity
All electronics generate unintentional EM emanations, which EMI/EMC
treats as noise. While it may not be immediately obvious, the unintentional
EM emanations created by computing devices are intrinsically linked to
both the input data and operations (instructions) used during a compu-
tation. Researchers have identified [88] and quantified [89] instruction-
dependent EM emanations, and localized [90] the sources of these em-
anations. At each processor cycle, the CPU draws a current that is a
direct result of the instruction(s) being executed. Much of this instruction-
dependent current is drawn by the CPU clock circuitry and by the circuitry
which performs new computations (i.e., switches on and off). This creates
a strong current at the CPU clock frequency and acts as a carrier mod-
ulated by the clock-to-cycle variations in program activity (i.e., executed
instructions). As this carrier modulated current flows through the wires
within the processor and on the device’s printed circuit board (PCB), it cre-
ates EM emanations at the CPU clock frequency (and its harmonics) [91].
This is demonstrated in Figure 2.1 where different program activities were
exploited to create different AM sideband signals at different frequencies
(falt) [88]. To analyze such program-related sideband signals, we first am-
plitude demodulate the monitored EM signal at the CPU clock frequency.
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Figure 2.1: A carrier at clock frequency fc and its left and right sidebands
generated by program activity [88].
2.3.2 Amplitude Demodulation of EM side-channel signal
We receive the emanated EM signal using a probe or an antenna, ampli-
tude demodulate the received signal r(t) at the CPU clock frequency fc, and
digitize the demodulated signal using an analog-to-digital converter (ADC).
xa(t) = |r(t)× ej2πfct| (2.1)
Here, xa(t) is the amplitude demodulated analog signal, and t denotes
the time. The demodulated signal xa(t) is then passed through an anti-
aliasing filter with bandwidth B, and sampled at a sampling period Ts.
xd(n) = xa(nTs) (2.2)
Here, xd(n) denotes the sampled signal at sample index n. The anti-aliasing
filter cancels unwanted signals with frequencies beyond fc ± B. Note that,






INTRUSION DETECTION THROUGH ELECTROMAGNETIC SIGNAL
ANALYSIS
3.1 Overview
In this chapter, we present a novel framework called IDEA (Intrusion De-
tection through Electromagnetic signal Analysis) that exploits electromag-
netic (EM) side-channel signals to detect malicious activity on embedded
and cyber-physical systems (CPSs). IDEA first records EM emanations
from an uncompromised reference device to establish a baseline of refer-
ence EM patterns. IDEA then monitors the target device’s EM emanations.
When the observed EM emanations deviate from the reference patterns,
IDEA reports this as an anomalous or malicious activity.
IDEA does not require any resource or infrastructure on, or any modifi-
cation to, the monitored system itself. As such, IDEA is especially suitable
for monitoring resource-constrained security-critical embedded devices. In
addition, IDEA is isolated from the target device and monitors the device
without any physical contact. This isolation protects IDEA form any attack
on the monitored device and ensures that the integrity of IDEA is not com-
promised even if the monitored device itself is completely compromised.
Furthermore, the deployment of IDEA is relatively simple; IDEA does not
make any change to the monitored system and thus creates no regulatory,
safety, or disruption concern for the system. Moreover, IDEA identifies
malicious activities using the trusted references only, without any knowl-
edge of malware signatures. This means that no training on malware or
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anomalous behavior is needed and consequently removes the need for reg-
ular updates for new malware signatures. Thus, IDEA ensures protection
against zero-day attacks.
We evaluate IDEA by monitoring the target device while it is execut-
ing embedded applications with malicious code injections such as DDoS,
Ransomware, and code modification. We further implement a control-flow
hijack attack, an advanced persistent threat, and a firmware modification
on three CPSs: an embedded medical device called SyringePump, an in-
dustrial PID Controller, and a Robotic Arm, using a popular embedded
system, Arduino UNO. The results demonstrate that IDEA can detect dif-
ferent attacks with excellent accuracy (AUC > 99.5%, and 100% detection
with less than 1% false positives) from distances up to 3 m.
The main contributions of this chapter are:
• IDEA - a novel framework that leverages the device’s EM side-channel
signal for intrusion detection.
• A training method that (1) constructs a dictionary of reference EM
signatures from an uncompromised reference device, and (2) exploits
clustering to reduce the dictionary size for efficient computing.
• An anomaly detection algorithm that (1) reconstructs EM signals us-
ing the reference dictionary, and (2) identifies anomalous EM signals
based on the reconstruction error.
• Empirical evaluations that demonstrate that (1) IDEA is effective against
different malware behavior (e.g., DDoS, Ransomware, etc.) (2) IDEA
is effective for monitoring different embedded devices (e.g., FPGAs,
IoTs, CPSs), (3) IDEA is robust against noise and interference, and (4)
IDEA can detect malicious activities from up to 3 m distance.
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The rest of the chapter is organized as follows: Section 3.2 states the
envisioned threat model, Section 3.3 describes IDEA - our framework for
anomaly-based intrusion detection, Section 3.4 presents the experimental
evaluations, and finally, Section 3.5 presents the summary.
3.2 Threat Model
IDEA is an external monitoring system for high-assurance CPSs (such
as embedded medical devices) and can detect the execution of malware
through the EM side-channel of the target device. The envisioned threat
model involves the following assumptions:
1. The monitoring framework (IDEA) does not know the nature of the
attack or its EM signature(s) and only relies on the signatures for the mon-
itored application itself. We assume that IDEA always has correct refer-
ence models for malware-free signatures of the monitored applications and
these models can not be compromised.
2. The adversary has physical and/or remote access to the target device
and has prior knowledge of the device and its software. The attacker can
thus exploit any vulnerability (e.g., a buffer-overflow) to execute a mali-
cious activity on the system by either launching a separate thread/process
and starting a potential cyber-attack (e.g., DDoS) or modifying/re-using
the existing application to disrupt or change the original functionality of
the targeted system (e.g., control-flow hijack). Furthermore, the adversary
can even modify the system’s source code and libraries and/or reprogram
the system to start a malicious activity. However, IDEA does not know
anything about the nature of the attack and only reports an error if an
anomaly is detected.
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Figure 3.1: Overview of IDEA framework.
3.3 Intrusion Detection through Electromagnetic Signal Analysis
Figure 3.1 illustrates the workflow of IDEA. The signals in both training
and monitoring phases are demodulated, low-pass filtered, and sampled
before they are subjected to the main part of IDEA signal processing. IDEA
exploits techniques similar to template-based pattern matching to identify
anomalous (hence, potentially malicious) activity during the program ex-
ecution. In the training phase, IDEA learns a dictionary of reference EM
signatures or “words” by executing trusted programs on an uncompro-
mised reference device. Next, in the monitoring phase, it continuously
monitors the target device’s EM signal by matching it and reconstructing
it using the dictionary. When the reconstruction error is above a prede-
fined threshold (i.e., there is a significant deviation from the reference EM
signatures), IDEA reports an anomaly (intrusion). The rest of this section
describes IDEA in further detail.
3.3.1 AM Demodulation
Unintentional EM emanations occur at various frequencies, but of particu-
lar importance is the frequency band centered around the clock frequency
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of the processor, a.k.a. the Central Processing Unit (CPU). This is be-
cause this frequency band contains signals that are primarily a function
of the instruction sequence executed by the CPU. Each processor cycle,
the CPU draws a current, which is a direct result of the instruction(s) ex-
ecution. Much of this instruction-dependent current is drawn by the CPU
clock circuitry and by the circuitry that performs new computations (i.e.,
switches on and off) every CPU clock cycle. This creates a strong current at
the CPU clock frequency, which acts as a carrier modulated by the clock-
to-cycle variations in program activity (i.e., executed instructions). These
currents flow through the wires within the processor and on the device’s
printed circuit board (PCB). At CPU and memory clock frequencies (and
their harmonics), the EM emanations created can propagate far enough
to be observed with a high signal-to-noise ratio [91]. When observed this
way, the emanating device has much in common with a communications
system since the device is a transmitter which (inefficiently and uninten-
tionally) transmits a message signal carrying information about program
activity using an amplitude modulated carrier (i.e., the clock signal). We
can then receive and demodulate this signal using wireless communica-
tions techniques. All EM signals, both in the training phase and in the
monitoring phase, are AM demodulated at the processor clock frequency,
low-pass filtered with an anti-aliasing filter, and sampled before being sent
for signal processing.
3.3.2 Training Phase: Dictionary Learning
The training phase consists of learning a dictionary of EM signatures
through the execution of trusted programs on a reference device. We
execute trusted programs on an uncompromised device and record the
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corresponding EM signals. We use different inputs to execute different
control flow paths, as described in [35]. Ideally, we would like to observe
all possible control flow paths. However, in a practical scenario, this may
require too many inputs (hence, too many training examples). For exam-
ple, a twenty level nested IF ELSE condition will have 220 = 1048576 different
execution paths. Nevertheless, we aim at observing most control flow ex-
ecution paths and try to ensure that even if there are unobserved control
flow paths, they are either highly unlikely or relatively brief. These goals
are the same as those that guide program testing. So, program inputs
created to provide good test coverage of a program are likely to satisfy the
needs of IDEA training. Once we have the training signals, we learn the
dictionary words using the following process.
Learning Words
The demodulated EM signal is split into multiple overlapping short-duration
windows that are recorded as dictionary entries or “words”. These words
correspond to the EM signature of the underlying program execution. All
dictionary words have the same word-length l. Each word is shifted by s
samples from the previous one. When s is small, we end up with densely
overlapping words. Consequently, we learn a dictionary with a large num-
ber of words with slight variability (i.e., shift). This can help to achieve
shift-invariant pattern matching. Shift-invariance is necessary because
of hardware events, such as cache misses, that delay (or shift) the sub-
sequent execution (and the corresponding EM signal). A cache miss can
potentially occur at many different points of the program execution. It is
neither practical nor even possible to generate a training set with all possi-
ble scenarios of cache hits or misses. Therefore, creating a dictionary with
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densely overlapped words can help us match EM signatures better under
variability due to hardware activity.
Word Normalization
All dictionary words are post processed by mean subtraction and scale
normalization:
w = (w0 − µ)/σ (3.1)
Here, w denotes the normalized word, µ is the mean, and σ is the standard
deviation of the unnormalized word w0.
This normalization improves the matching accuracy by ensuring that
the matching is based on the pattern (i.e., the relative shape of the wave-
form) rather than on the actual amplitude. For instance, due to different
positions of the antenna, the distance from the processor may change be-
tween the training and the monitoring phase. Hence, the training and the
monitored signals can have different scales or amplifications. This nor-
malization nullifies such issues.
Dictionary Reduction through Clustering
Next, we apply clustering to reduce the number of dictionary entries. All
applications have loops, which tend to generate repetitive EM patterns.
Likewise, the same control flow paths are often reiterated at different
points of the execution and generate similar EM patterns. Consequently,
the reference dictionary can have a large number of words or patterns that
are very similar and correspond to the same code execution. The objective
of clustering is to assign similar words or EM patterns into a single cluster,
and exploit the cluster centroid as the representative of the cluster. Using
cluster centroids as dictionary words improves computational efficiency by
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reducing the number of dictionary entries.
As the number of clusters k (i.e., the number of unique EM patterns) is
not known a priori, popular clustering algorithms such as k-means can not
be used for the dictionary reduction. Instead, we use a threshold-based
clustering, where the threshold t is used as a parameter. Given a cluster
centroid ci, the algorithm proceeds by alternating between two steps:
Assignment Step: Assign each unassigned word wp whose Euclidean
distance from the centroid ci is less than the threshold t to the cluster Si.
Si = {wp : ‖wp − ci‖2 < t ∧ wp /∈ Sj ∀j, 1 ≤ j < i} (3.2)








Once the assignments no longer change, select a new cluster centroid
randomly from the words that have not yet been assigned to any cluster.
The algorithm converges when all words are assigned to a cluster.
3.3.3 Monitoring Phase: Intrusion Detection
In the monitoring phase, the EM signal is continuously monitored and
matched against the dictionary, and anomalous activity is reported when
the monitored signal deviates significantly from its dictionary-based recon-
struction.
Matching and Reconstruction
The monitored EM signal is split into windows and matched against the
dictionary using the 1-Nearest Neighbor algorithm [92], with Euclidean
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Figure 3.2: An example of verifying the monitored signal using dictionary
words. The monitored signal (shown with black lines) is verified against
training (red, blue, and green) signals.
distance as the distance metric. The signal is then reconstructed by re-
placing each window with its best-match dictionary word. This is illus-
trated in Figure 3.2. The entire signal can be reconstructed by concate-
nating these best-match words that correspond to the signal’s sequence of
windows, and this reconstructed signal is then used for anomaly (intru-
sion) detection.
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Figure 3.3: Intrusion detection from reconstruction error: the squared
reconstruction error is passed through an SMA filter to reduce false posi-
tives.
Detection
The detection continuously compares the monitored signal with the recon-
structed signal. Specifically, we compute the per-sample reconstruction
error as the squared difference between samples of the monitored and the
reconstructed signal:
e(n) = (x(n)− y(n))2 (3.4)
Here, x(n), y(n), and e(n) denote the monitored signal, the reconstructed
signal, the squared reconstruction error signal, respectively and n denotes
the sample-index.
The detection algorithm is illustrated in Figure 3.3. Due to considera-
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Figure 3.4: Top green curve: original program execution; Bottom
red curve: program execution with intrusion; Black curve: IDEA-
reconstructed signal. Note that black curve better matches with green
than with red curve.
tions presented in Section 3.3.4 below, we then apply an L-samples long








Finally, we set a threshold on ẽ, and whenever this threshold is breached,
we report an intrusion. Figure 3.4 illustrates how reconstructed curves
based on IDEA algorithm match the original program execution vs. the ex-
ecution with malware. From the plot we can observe that the reconstructed
signal deviates significantly from the execution with malware compared to




The performance of IDEA depends on a number of system parameters,
such as word-length l, word-shift s, and order of the SMA filter L. The rest
of this section is a discussion of how these system parameters are chosen.
Word-Length
The word-length l has an impact on the performance of the proposed sys-
tem. The optimal word-length l is a tradeoff between confidence in a match
(the longer the word, the more reliable the match) and likelihood of a good
match (the shorter the word, the more likely it is to find a dictionary word
that matches it well).
Therefore, the word-length l should be long enough to avoid good matches
among a set of unrelated signals. To achieve that, a word in a dictionary
should represent a relatively long sequence of processor instructions or
hardware activity. This ensures that it is unlikely that a non-trained pro-
gram will produce a sequence of executed processor instructions that is
an excellent match for any dictionary entry of a trained program.
On the other hand, the word-length l should be short enough so that
random events, such as cache misses or interrupts, do not preclude good
matches. For example, if we use a word that is very long, it will be diffi-
cult to find good matches in the dictionary of any reasonable size. This is
because different inputs and hardware activities result in different signals
when executing the same code, a reasonable-sized dictionary can contain
only a small subset of the possible valid words, and a (long) window of
the monitored signal will likely exhibit many input-dependent and hard-
ware behavior that do not match any of the dictionary words. By using
a smaller word length we limit the number of word variants that can be
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Figure 3.5: Histogram for maximum mean squared reconstruction error
with different word-lengths.
produced, which reduces the dictionary size required for “full” coverage of
these variants. Even when dictionary coverage of word variants is not com-
plete and a window of the monitored signal has a set of input-dependent
and hardware behavior that is not represented in the dictionary, a smaller
word length increases the probability that the dictionary contains a word
that matches the window for most of its duration, and thus still produces
a reasonably small reconstruction distance.
To estimate the optimal word-length l, we insert snippets of untrained
signals into the trained or trusted reference signals. First, we record EM
signals by executing a benchmark program with different inputs. Next, we
follow a 10 fold cross-validation to test each of these signals with and with-
out an “untrained” insertion from a different benchmark program. Here,
signals without insertion represent class 0 or “known”, while signals with
insertion correspond to class 1 or “intrusion”. Figure 3.5 shows the his-
tograms corresponding to “known” and “intrusion” with different word-
lengths. For w = 16 samples, the Maximum Mean Squared Reconstruction
Error (MMSRE) is low for both known (or trained) and intrusion (or un-
trained) signals (i.e., even an untrained signal can be matched with words
in the dictionary). As a result, the two histograms overlap. However, for
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w = 32 samples, MMSRE corresponding to the known signal is significantly
lower than that of the intrusion, and there exists a clear threshold between
the two classes. When the word-length is much larger, i.e., w = 128 sam-
ples, MMSRE for both known and intrusion signals gets much higher (i.e.,
even a trained signal cannot be matched with low Euclidean distance).
Hence, the two histograms cannot be separated anymore.
These experimental evaluations reveal that for any intrusion larger than
256 samples, IDEA can achieve Area Under the Curve (AUC) better than
0.9995 on the Receiver Operating Characteristic (ROC) curve for any word-
length between 32 to 64 samples. If not specified differently, the rest of the
paper assumes word-length w = 32 of samples. This corresponds to 5 µs
of execution time, which is about 250 processor clock cycles on the FPGA
board.
Word-Shift
Another parameter that impacts the performance of IDEA is word-shift.
Each “word” in the dictionary has to be shifted some number of samples
from the previous one in order to compensate for hardware activities such
as cache hit or miss. We estimate the optimal word-shift s through exper-
imental evaluation. Again, we exploit a 10 fold cross-validation in which
snippets of insertions from an “untrained" program are treated as intru-
sions. Figure 3.6 shows the ROC curve for different word-shifts for an
intrusion of 128 samples. It is clear that s = 1 performs the best, and the
larger s results in smaller AUC. This is intuitive as s = 1 mimics shift-
invariant signal matching most closely. However, it should be noted that
the detection performance for s = 2 is comparable to that of s = 1. Hence,
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Figure 3.6: ROC curves for intrusion detection with different word-shift.
number of entries in the dictionary would be roughly halved for s = 2
compared to s = 1. So, the memory requirement would be halved, and
consequently, so would be the computational time. Nevertheless, as we
intend to highlight the performance of our system, we use s = 1 in the
remainder of this paper.
Filter Order
In order to justify the use of the SMA filter and to determine its optimal
length, consider the following detection problem. Let ε(n) , x(n) − y(n)
denote the error signal, defined as the difference between the monitored
and reconstructed signals. Observing an L-samples segment thereof ε(n−
L+ 1), . . . , ε(n), we wish to decide whether:
• H0 : This is a valid program execution segment; or
• H1 : This is an intrusion code segment.
We begin by attributing two simplified statistical models to the error signal
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under each hypothesis: ε(n) is assumed to be an independent, identically
distributed (iid) zero-mean Gaussian process, but with a different variance
under each of the different hypotheses:
• H0 : ε(n) ∼ N (0, σ20)
• H1 : ε(n) ∼ N (0, σ21)
where σ20 < σ
2
1 are fixed variances (presumed known, for now). The Likeli-
hood Ratio Test (LRT) for deciding between the two hypotheses then takes
the form:
f(ε(n− L+ 1), . . . , ε(n)|H1)





where f(·|Hi) denotes the conditional joint probability distribution func-
tion (pdf) of the observations given Hi, i = 0, 1, and η is a threshold value.







































where κ , σ21/σ
2
0 > 1 denotes the ratio between the two variances. This
means that the average of squared samples of ε(n) over the L-samples
observation interval is to be compared to some threshold η̃. This average is
precisely ẽ(n), the output of a length-L SMA filter in (4.10), with e(n) , ε2(n).
To determine an optimal value for L, note first that the mean and vari-
ance of ẽ(n) under Hi are (resp.) σ2i and
2
L
σ4i , i = 0, 1. We note further,
that if L is sufficiently large (say, larger than 10 or so), considering the
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Central Limit Theorem, the distribution of ẽ(n) under each hypothesis is
approximately Gaussian. Consequently, the false positive and false nega-
tive probabilities can be shown to decay monotonically in L. Therefore, to
have them minimized, L should take the largest possible value that does
not breach the H1 model. Namely, L has to be chosen as the full length of
the shortest possible intrusion. Since that length is not known a priori, we
chose to set the filter order equal to the shortest length of insertion that
we intend to detect. If not specified differently, we use L = 256 as the filter
length.
Note that in reality, the situation is somewhat more complicated than
described above. First, the iid Gaussian signal model for ε(n) is inaccurate,
as its samples are expected to be correlated and not necessarily Gaussian
distributed; The variances σ21 and σ
2
0 would rarely be known; And recon-
struction errors may be very high for a few brief, sporadic segments, even
under H0, resulting either from lack of full coverage in the training phase
(i.e., lack of appropriate training examples that follow the same control flow
path as the monitored signal) or from the variability of hardware activities
between the training signal and the monitored signal. These complica-
tions certainly undermine any claim of optimality of the LRT in this case.
However, the rationale behind the resulting test remains valid, justifying
the use of the SMA filter and the choice of L. For example, the possibility
of short occurrences of large errors under H0 would merely increase the
mean and variance of ẽ(n) under H0, thereby increasing the false positive
rate. Nevertheless, the dependence of this rate on L remains monotoni-
cally decreasing, still supporting our choice of the largest possible L that
does not breach H1.
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3.4 Experimental Evaluations
In this section, we present our experimental results on detecting several
different types of malware on different applications and embedded sys-
tems. It is important to emphasize that IDEA is not limited to these appli-
cations and/or malware, but fundamentally can be applied to any system
that has observable EM emanations.
3.4.1 Experiments with Different Malware Behavior
To show the effectiveness of IDEA on detecting different malware behavior,
we selected 3 applications from the SIR repository [93]: (Replace, Print To-
kens, and Schedule) and implemented three common types of embedded
system malware payloads (DDoS attacks, Ransomware attacks, and code
modification) on an Altera DE-1 prototype board (Cyclone II FPGA with a
NIOS II soft-processor) while executing any of these SIR applications. We
selected applications from SIR repository because they are relatively com-
pact (allowing manual checks of our results to get a deeper understanding
of what affects the IDEA accuracy), are commonly used to evaluate the per-
formance of techniques that analyze program execution, and have many
program inputs available (each taking a different overall path through the
program code), so we can use disjoint sets of inputs for training and mon-
itoring and yet have a large number of inputs for training (to improve code
coverage) and monitoring (to obtain representative results).
For DDoS cyber-attack, we assume that the attacker exploits a vulnera-
bility (e.g., buffer-overflow) to divert the control-flow (e.g., using code-reuse
attack) to a code that sends DDoS packets in rapid succession, without
waiting for a reply from the target. After sending a burst of packets, the
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malware returns execution for a while to the original application, so the
device continues to perform its primary functionality. In the case of an
embedded device, e.g., Altera DE-1 (Cyclone II FPGA) board, there is no
traditional network (e.g., Ethernet) port. So we instead implement the
packet-sending activity using the JTAG port.
For Ransomware attack, we implement a Cryptoviral [94], that encrypts
the victim’s data and demands a ransom in return for the decryption key.
We assume that the attacker inserted the malicious code through firmware
modification. We used Advanced Encryption Standard, AES-128 for en-
cryption. Encryption of large files is time-consuming and can be detected
easily by IDEA. To make things more challenging, the Ransomware we
implement encrypts only one encryption block of AES-128, which corre-
sponds to a 16-byte data. Note that more secure ciphers, e.g., AES-256,
have larger encryption blocks and are thus easier to detect.
For code modification, which is the basis of an important class of mal-
ware (APT and firmware modification attacks), we assume that the mal-
ware has already successfully modified the source code of the program
and that the goal of IDEA is to detect when this modified code executes.
For example, in the Replace benchmark, there is a function called sub-
line(), which is used to search for words in an input string. In a scenario
where authorities use this code to look for names in intercepted commu-
nication, the attacker’s modification of this code would prevent any word
that begins with specific initial letters from being reported.
Setup: To observe the EM emanations, we used a 2.4-2.5 GHz 18dBi panel
antenna that was placed 1 m, 2 m, and 3 m away from the device (see Fig-
ure 3.7). We used a (relatively expensive) Agilent MXA N9020A spectrum
analyzer to demodulate and record the EM emanations, primarily so we
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Figure 3.7: Experimental setup used to collect EM traces from distance.
can have more control and flexibility in our investigations. However, in the
next section (3.4.2), we will show that a sub-$1000 SDR receiver (USRP-
B200mini [95]) can be used instead. To assess IDEA’s performance, we
have used program input sets from [93]. Malware injections occur in
roughly 30% of the runs (randomly selected), and in each injection, the
injection time (relative to the beginning time of the run) is drawn randomly
from a set of 10 predefined values.
Detection Performance: To evaluate the performance of the intrusion
detection system, we apply a 10 fold cross-validation. We execute each
benchmark program with different inputs. Some of these executions are
infected with malicious intrusions. As the system does not assume any
a priori knowledge about the threat models or the intrusions, we do not
use any of these infected executions for training the system. Likewise,
we select all the system parameters through experiments with “untrained”
insertions from a different benchmark program, without using any ac-
tual infected signal. The non-infected signals are randomly divided into
10 roughly equal-sized subsets. In each fold, we test one of these subsets
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Figure 3.8: Receiver Operating Characteristic curves for intrusion detec-
tion on three different benchmark programs for different variants of mal-
ware.
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along with the infected signals, while the rest of the non-infected signals
are used for training the system. The objective of the experiment is to eval-
uate how successfully the system can identify and differentiate between
the infected and the non-infected signals.
We follow this procedure with three different benchmark programs,
namely Print Tokens, Replace, and Schedule. For Print Tokens, a total of
637 executions were recorded, out of which 142 were infected with different
variants of malware - 68 Ransomware, 66 DDoS, and 8 code modification.
In case of Replace, we recorded 691 executions including 138 infected ones
out of which 68 were Ransomware, 65 were DDoS, and 5 were code modifi-
cation. For Schedule, we collected 681 executions where 144 of them were
infected with 68 Ransomware, 67 DDoS, and 9 code modification.
Figure 3.8 plots the ROC curves for IDEA intrusion detection on differ-
ent benchmark programs with different variants of intrusions. It shows
excellent performance in all three benchmark programs, with Area Under
the Curve (AUC) very close to 1 for Ransomware and DDoS malware. Code
modification creates a much smaller change in the program’s execution
and is much harder to detect. However, IDEA still detects it with an AUC
> 97.5%. Specifically, detection of all code modifications is achieved by
tolerating a false positive rate of no more than 1% in Print Tokens and Re-
place, and no more than 12% in Schedule.
Detection at Different Distances: Next, we test IDEA at three different
distances (1 m, 2 m, and 3 m) from the monitored device. The results (Fig-
ure 3.9) show that the performance of IDEA remains stable over different
distances. In fact, for all three benchmark programs, the performance is
quite similar at 1 m and 2 m, with AUC better than 99.5%. The perfor-
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Figure 3.9: Receiver Operating Characteristic curves for intrusion detec-
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Figure 3.10: Receiver Operating Characteristic curves for intrusion detec-
tion at different SNR.
mance degrades somewhat at 3 m, achieving 99% AUC for Replace and
98% AUC for Print Tokens and Schedule. The degradation in accuracy at
the 3 m distance is mainly due to a reduced signal-to-noise ratio (SNR)
as the monitored signal weakens with distance. We believe that these re-
sults can be improved by using customized (higher-gain) antennas and
low-noise amplifiers.
Detection at Different SNR: To evaluate IDEA in presence of environ-
mental EM noise, we apply Additive White Gaussian Noise (AWGN) to the
monitored signal, and test IDEA by monitoring the benchmark application
Replace at three different SNR (20 dB, 10 dB, and 5 dB). The results are
shown in Figure 3.10. Experimental evaluation demonstrates that IDEA is
robust against EM noise. In fact, IDEA achieves an excellent performance
(AUC > 99.5%) at 20 dB SNR. Furthermore, at 10 dB SNR, IDEA can still
detect intrusions with an AUC > 95%. However, at 5 dB SNR, the detection
performance degrades to a 67.4% AUC.
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In addition, IDEA is inherently robust against out-of-band EM interfer-
ence from adjacent devices. IDEA monitors the target device at a frequency
band around its processor’s clock frequency. Any EM interference with fre-
quencies outside this monitored band is blocked by the anti-aliasing filter
during the analog-to-digital conversion (ADC). Since each device emits EM
signal at its own clock frequency, interference is limited and can be filtered
out using signal processing.
3.4.2 Experiments with Cyber-Physical Systems
To emphasize the practicality of IDEA and to demonstrate its ability to
successfully detect real malware on real CPSs, we use IDEA to monitor
three industrial CPSs implemented on a well-known embedded system,
Arduino UNO. We use a control-flow hijacking attack, an advanced per-
sistent threat (APT), and a firmware modification attack on these CPSs for
evaluation.
The first CPS we use is called a SyringePump. A SyringePump dispenses
or withdraws a precise amount of fluid, e.g., in hospitals for applying med-
ication at frequent intervals [96], and is a representative of a medical CPS.
The device typically consists of a syringe filled with medicine, an actuator
(e.g., stepper motor), and a control unit (Arduino UNO) that takes com-
mands and produces controls for the stepper motor (a sample of this CPS
can be found in [96]). We implement a control-flow hijack attack on this
system by exploiting an existing buffer-overflow vulnerability in a sub-
routine (serialRead()) that reads the inputs which causes the program’s
control-flow to jump to an injected malicious code. We assume that the
adversary is interested in disrupting the correct performance of the sys-
tem by dispensing/withdrawing an unwanted amount of fluid, which could
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cause significant damage to the patient. Thus, the injected code causes
the syringe to dispense a random amount of fluid. The buffer-overflow
is implemented by sending a large input to overwrite the stack, followed
by the address of the “injected” malicious code that overwrites the actual
return address of the serialRead().
The second system is a proportional-integral-derivative (PID) controller
that is used for controlling the temperature of a soldering iron. This type of
system could also be used to control the temperature or any other critical
value in other settings, such as a building or an industrial process, and
thus is representative of a large class of industrial CPSs. Using a feedback
loop and a history of previous temperatures, the system keeps and/or
changes the temperature to a desired temperature (a sample of this CPS
can be found in [97]). To implement an APT on this application, we assume
that the adversary’s malware (like in Stuxnet) has already infiltrated the
system and can reprogram the device. The adversary’s goal is to change a
critical value under some conditions, which in turn can cause damage to
the overall physical system. In our evaluation, we made a malicious modi-
fication to the source code so that the temperature history is altered under
a specific condition (e.g., for a specific model number). Consequently, the
system will set a wrong temperature. The injected code is only 2 lines of
code (i.e., IF(X) THEN LASTTEMPHISTORY = RANDOMVALUE).
The final system in our evaluation is a robotic arm. Robotic arms are
often used for manufacturing and are critical components of many mod-
ern factories. Robotic arms typically receive inputs/commands from a
user and/or sensors and move objects based on these inputs. There is
a growing concern in the security of these CPSs since they are typically
connected to the network and are exposed to cyber-threats (e.g., [98]). A
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Figure 3.11: Experimental setup for the SyringePump: (1) Arduino de-
vice with LCD, (2) stepper motor, (3) syringe, (4) magnetic probe and (5)
software-defined radio.
simple implementation of such a robot can be found in [99]. For this sys-
tem, we implement a firmware modification attack, where we assume that
the reference libraries (e.g., library for Servo, Serial, etc.) are compromised
(this can be also considered as a zero-day vulnerability). Note that we
assume that IDEA’s training contains the “unmodified” version of these
libraries (baseline reference data). In this attack, we modify a subroutine
(writeMicroseconds()) in Arduino’s Servo library [100] by adding an extra if
condition to change the speed of the Servo motor randomly and reprogram
the system with this compromised library, assuming that the adversary is
interested in causing a malfunction in arm’s movement.
Setup. An Arduino UNO with an ATMEGA328p microprocessor clocked
at 16 MHz is used to implement the CPSs. A magnetic probe is used to
receive EM signals from the device. Figure 3.11 shows the experimental
setup for the SyringePump. For all measurements, we use a commercially
available SDR receiver (Ettus Research B200-mini) to record the signal.
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Table 3.1: Experimental results for three malware on three CPSs.
System AUC Malware Type
SyringePump > 0.999 Control-flow hijack
PID Controller > 0.999 APT
Robotic Arm > 0.999 Firmware Modification
B200-mini costs significantly lower than a spectrum analyzer and makes
IDEA a practical option for monitoring security-critical systems. For each
CPS, we use 25 randomly selected signals for training and 25 malware-free
and 25 malware-afflicted signals for testing.
Detection Performance. Table 3.1 summarizes the detection accuracy of
IDEA on the three CPSs. As seen in the table, in all cases, IDEA has suc-
cessfully detected every instance of malware without reporting any false
positive. This makes IDEA a promising framework for monitoring critical
CPSs, where a high detection accuracy is required while having a low false-
positive rate. Note that in all cases, the runtime for the malicious code is
significantly less (< 0.01%) than the overall runtime of the application.
3.4.3 Experiments with IoT Devices
To demonstrate the robustness of IDEA, we also use it to monitor an A13-
OLinuXino (Cortex A8 processor) IoT board. Unlike the FPGA-based sys-
tem that runs the application “on bare metal,” this board runs a Linux
operating system (OS). The defensive mechanisms already present in the
OS make it harder to inject prototype malware activity. Instead, we model
malware injection by injecting snippets of signals from a different (not-
trained-on) program. For this experiment, we use Replace as the reference
program, on to which signal-snippets from Print Tokens were inserted as
anomalous (not-trained-on) signal. This approach also allows injections
of any chosen duration and the use of different signals for different injec-
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Figure 3.12: Receiver Operating Characteristic curves for intrusion detec-
tion on an FPGA (top) and on an IoT Device (bottom).
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tion instances. In contrast, construction of even one short-duration actual
malware instance is very challenging. For example, a single packet sent
in a DDoS attack, or single-block encryption in Ransomware, lasts much
longer than any of our signal-snippet injections.
To allow a direct comparison between our real-malware and signal-
snippet injections, we also perform signal-snippet injection experiments
on the DE-1 FPGA board. We use 10-fold cross-validation, and test signals
from a trained benchmark program Replace, with or without insertions or
intrusions from Print Tokens. Figure 3.12 shows the experimental results.
We can observe that intrusions longer than 256 samples (i.e., 200 instruc-
tions or 40 µs length) on the FPGA are detected with an AUC of 99.95%. For
the IoT board, an AUC better than 99.8% is achieved for intrusions with at
least 1024 samples (i.e., 800 instructions or 7.94 µs length). The difference
in duration of the intrusion that is needed to achieve the same AUC on the
two devices is mainly due to OS activity that is present on the IoT board
and absent on the FPGA board. This OS activity introduces variation in the
signals, increasing reconstruction error even for valid executions. This, in
turn, raises the reconstruction error threshold for reporting an anomaly at
a given confidence level, so more anomalous samples are needed to reach
this increased reconstruction error threshold.
3.5 Summary
In this chapter, we presented IDEA - a novel intrusion detection frame-
work that uses electromagnetic (EM) side-channel signals to protect em-
bedded devices from stealthy attacks. IDEA first records EM emanations
from an uncompromised device to establish a baseline of reference EM
patterns. Then, IDEA continuously monitors the target device’s EM em-
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anations, comparing the observed EM emanations against the reference
dictionary. When the observed EM emanations deviate significantly from
the entries in the reference dictionary, IDEA reports this as an anoma-
ly/intrusion. Finally, we demonstrated IDEA’s effectiveness by monitoring
different embedded devices and detecting different malicious attacks with
excellent accuracy.
A major concern for commercial deployment of the IDEA monitoring
system is its cost. However, we envision that IDEA will be deployed to
monitor critical and high-assurance CPSs, e.g., critical infrastructures,
military systems, hospital equipment, etc. In such scenarios, the cost
of deployment (e.g., cost of antenna, software-defined radio, and signal
processing) is offset by the cost of the monitored system and by the cost
and consequences of the security breach. In addition, the deployment of
IDEA is relatively simple; IDEA does not make any change to the moni-
tored system and thus creates no regulatory, safety, or disruption concern
for the system. Another important concern with IDEA is its scalability.
IDEA requires very high training coverage, which is difficult to achieve
for larger programs. However, we exploit software engineering techniques
that ensure high path coverage for training. Moreover, IDEA stores EM
patterns corresponding to normal program activities in a reference dictio-
nary. This dictionary may grow prohibitively large for larger applications.
While we use clustering to keep the dictionary size manageable, future
work should investigate feature dimensionality reduction techniques (e.g.,
principal component analysis) to further optimize the dictionary size with-
out sacrificing the detection accuracy.
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CHAPTER 4
MALWARE DETECTION USING NEURAL NETWORK MODEL FOR
ELECTROMAGNETIC SIDE-CHANNEL SIGNALS
4.1 Overview
In this chapter, we present a novel malware detection system for critical
embedded and cyber-physical systems (CPSs). The system exploits elec-
tromagnetic (EM) side-channel signals from the device to detect malicious
activity. During training, the system models EM emanations from an un-
compromised device using a neural network. These EM patterns act as
fingerprints for the normal program activity. Next, we continuously moni-
tor the target device’s EM emanations. Any deviation in the device’s activity
causes a variation in the EM fingerprint, which in turn violates the trained
model, and is reported as an anomalous activity.
We evaluate the system with different malware behavior (DDoS, Ran-
somware, and Code Modification) on different applications using an Altera
Nios-II soft-processor. Experimental evaluation reveals that the framework
can detect DDoS and Ransomware with 100% accuracy (AUC = 1.0), and
stealthier code modification (which is roughly a 5 µs long attack) with an
AUC ≈ 0.99, from distances up to 3 m. In addition, we execute control-
flow hijack, DDoS, and Ransomware on different applications using an
A13-OLinuXino - a Cortex A8 ARM processor single board computer with
Debian Linux OS. Furthermore, we evaluate the practicality and the ro-
bustness of our system on a medical CPS, implemented using two differ-
ent devices (TS-7250 and A13-OLinuXino), while executing a control-flow
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hijack attack. Our evaluations show that our framework can detect these
attacks with 100% accuracy.
The major contributions of this chapter are:
• A novel framework that exploits neural network to model the device’s
EM side-channel signal for non-intrusive, external, and contactless
malware detection.
• A training method that (1) models EM signals from an uncompro-
mised reference device, (2) does not require any knowledge of the
nature of the malware attack (or its EM signature), and (3) does not
require access to the application’s source code or control-flow graph.
• A non-causal signal modeling that exploits signal masking to achieve
low prediction error for known or ‘trained-on’ signal patterns and high
prediction error for unknown or ‘not trained-on’ signal patterns.
• Empirical evaluations that demonstrate that (1) the system can detect
even stealthy (e.g., 5 µs long) malicious attacks with high accuracy
and low detection latency, (2) the system is equally effective for dif-
ferent applications and different embedded devices, (3) the system is
robust against noise and interference, and (4) the system can detect
malicious activities from up to 4 m distance.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows: Section 4.2 states the
envisioned threat model, Section 4.3 details our framework for malware
detection, Section 4.4 presents the experimental evaluations, and finally,
Section 4.5 provides the summary.
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4.2 Threat Model
We propose a remote monitoring system for critical and high assurance
embedded and cyber-physical devices (e.g., medical devices) by leverag-
ing the device’s EM side-channel signal. The system can detect malicious
attacks through anomalous EM emanation pattern detection. The envi-
sioned threat model includes the following assumptions:
1. The malware detection system does not have any prior knowledge
of the nature of the attack or its EM signature(s). The monitoring system
only exploits the EM signature(s) of the monitored application. In addi-
tion, the detection system may not have access to the application’s source
code or control-flow graph (CFG). However, we assume that the system
has a reference model for malware-free EM signature(s), which we learn
by monitoring an uncompromised trusted device. We further assume that
the reference model is not compromised by adversarial attacks.
2. The attacker has access to the monitored device. Furthermore, the
attacker has prior knowledge of the application, and consequently, can
exploit any vulnerability to execute malicious attacks on the system. For
instance, the attacker may exploit a buffer-flow vulnerability to launch a
separate thread or process to execute a cyber-attack (e.g., DDoS). Like-
wise, the attacker may execute a control-flow hijack by modifying and dis-
rupting the existing application and its original functionality. In addition,
the attacker may even reprogram the application by modifying its source
code and execute malicious activity (e.g., code modification attack). How-
ever, the proposed malware detection system does not assume any knowl-
edge of the nature of the attack and detects malicious activity through the
deviation in the device’s EM signature(s).
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Figure 4.1: Overview of the proposed malware detection system.
4.3 Malware Detection System
We exploit a multilayer neural network for anomalous (hence, potentially
malicious) program activity detection through the device’s EM side-channel
signal analysis. Figure 4.1 demonstrates a high-level overview of the pro-
posed system. During the training phase, the neural network is trained to
model the device’s EM side-channel signal by executing trusted programs
on a reference device. After training, the system is deployed, and it con-
tinuously monitors the EM emanation from the target device. When the
target device performs any malicious activity, it emanates anomalous (i.e.,
untrained) EM signal. The deviation in the EM signal causes higher pre-
diction error (as shown in Figure 4.2), and the system reports this as an
anomalous program activity. We describe the system in further detail in
the following sections.
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Figure 4.2: Prediction error with normal activity and malicious activity.
4.3.1 Amplitude Demodulation
Before feeding to the neural network, the emanated EM signal is first re-
ceived through an antenna, amplitude demodulated at the CPU clock fre-
quency, and digitized using an analog-to-digital converter (ADC). At each
processor cycle, as the CPU executes new instructions, the states of its in-
ternal digital circuits keep changing (i.e., switch on and off). This causes a
current at the CPU clock frequency whose amplitude is modulated by the
variations of the executed instructions. The carrier modulated current, in
turn, causes EM emanation, as it flows within the processor and through
the device’s printed circuit board (PCB) [91]. Thus to analyze the program-
related activities, we demodulate the received signal r(t) at the CPU clock
frequency fc.
xa(t) = |r(t)× ej2πfct| (4.1)
Here, xa(t) is the amplitude demodulated analog signal and t denotes the
time. The demodulated signal xa(t) is then passed through an anti-aliasing
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filter with bandwidth B and sampled at a sampling period Ts.
xd(n) = xa(nTs) (4.2)
Here, xd(n) denotes the sampled signal at sample index n. The anti-aliasing
filter cancels unwanted signals with frequencies beyond fc ± B. Note that,
the sampling period Ts is determined by the well known Nyquist criterion
1
Ts





This ensures that the value of x(n) is between zero and one and also makes
the system robust against changes in amplitude of the EM signals (e.g.,
due to change in the antenna’s position, etc.). Finally, x(n) is used as the
input for the neural network.
Furthermore, the amplitude demodulation safeguards against minor
deviations in the monitored device’s clock frequency. The monitored de-
vice can have clock frequency shift (due to manufacturing variation) and
drift (due to temperature changes). However, the system dynamically de-
tects the device’s clock frequency fc and applies synchronous amplitude
demodulation at the detected clock frequency (Equation: 4.1). Conse-
quently, the system is robust against clock frequency shift and drift of
the monitored device.
4.3.2 Proposed Neural Network
We use a Multilayer Perceptron (MLP) to model the device’s EM side-channel
signal. An MLP is a class of feedforward artificial neural network which
consists of at least three layers of nodes: an input layer, a hidden layer,
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Figure 4.3: Computation performed by a single node.
and an output layer. The output of a node in one layer is typically con-
nected as the input for all nodes in the next layer (i.e., fully-connected
layer). As such, it forms a weighted and directed graph and can be ex-
ploited to infer complex functions from observations [101, 102].
Each node j computes a weighted sum of its inputs x and adds a bias
bj to it (as illustrated in Figure 4.3).
zj = 〈wj,x〉+ bj (4.4)
Here, zj is the weighted sum of the inputs and the bias at node j, and
x is the input vector, x = [x1, x2, x3, ..., xm] and wj is the vector of connec-
tion weights, wj = [w1, w2, w3, ..., wm] and 〈·, ·〉 denotes the scalar product
operation. Next, zj is passed through an activation function (e.g., sig-
moid function, hyperbolic tangent function, linear, rectified liner func-
tions, etc.) [103].
yj = φ(zj) (4.5)
Here, yj denotes the output of node j after applying the activation function
φ(·). The activation adds non-linearity to the neural network and helps to
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Figure 4.4: Architecture of the proposed multilayer neural network.
model non-linear functions.
While each node performs a simple computation, a neural network can
learn to approximate complicated functions by adjusting its weights and
biases through training. During training, the network parameters (i.e.,
weights and biases) are optimized by minimizing a loss function (or cost
function) through the backpropagation algorithm [104].
As illustrated in Figure 4.4, the proposed system exploits a neural net-
work architecture that has six fully-connected hidden layers with 256,
128, 96, 64, 32, and 16 nodes, respectively. The input layer has 128 input
nodes (i.e., a vector of 128 consecutive samples of x(n)), while the output
layer has only one output node (i.e., the estimated amplitude for sample n).
All the hidden layers and the output layer use Rectified Linear Unit (ReLU)
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as activation function as rectified linear units have shown to improve per-
formance [105, 106] by mitigating the well-known vanishing gradient [107]
problem.
We used MLP to model EM patterns. The other popular network archi-
tectures include Convolutional Neural Network (CNN) and Recurrent Neu-
ral Network (RNN). CNNs are traditionally used for 2D data (e.g., image
classification), while RNNs are useful for sequence data (speech recogni-
tion, Natural Language Processing, time-series prediction, etc.). However,
RNNs are generally harder to train. MLPs, on the other hand, are very flex-
ible and can efficiently learn complex input to output mapping. Thus, we
chose MLP due to its simplicity, flexibility, and computational efficiency.
4.3.3 Masking and Prediction
Our proposed neural network models the device’s EM side-channel signal
and predicts (or outputs) the amplitude (or value) of the EM signal at any
instance, given the past and the future EM signal values (or samples) as
inputs. The output is
y(n) = f(x(n)) (4.6)
where f(·) denotes the neural network model for the device’s EM side-
channel signal, y(n) is the output (or predicted value), and x(n) denotes the
input vector of the neural network at sample-index n. The input vector x(n)
consists of D samples (i.e., D = 2(d − k) = 128 in our system). To better
predict y(n), our model uses d previous and d future samples. However, we
hide or mask the k immediate past and the k immediate future samples,
as illustrated in Figure 4.5. The main reason for using such a mask is
that the adjacent samples from an analog time-domain signal, such as an
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Figure 4.5: Past and future samples are used as inputs (black circles) to
predict the target output (green triangle). However, adjacent samples (red
crosses) are masked (i.e., not used as inputs).
EM signal, are usually highly correlated, especially at a higher sampling
rate. As such, the value of any unknown sample can be predicted through
the interpolation of its adjacent samples. However, interpolation would
not be useful for differentiating between normal and anomalous EM signal
patterns. We exploit the neural network model to differentiate anomalous
EM signal from normal EM signal through an increase in prediction error.
Therefore, we want a prediction model that works well (i.e., low prediction
error) for normal (i.e., trained) patterns but results in high prediction error
for anomalous (i.e., untrained) patterns. An interpolating function models
an unknown sample as a weighted sum of its neighbors. While interpo-
lation could be a good model for predicting highly correlated samples, it
would work equally well for both trained and untrained patterns. Thus,
the prediction error for the untrained EM signal would be similar to that
of the trained signal. Consequently, it would be difficult to differentiate
between the normal and the anomalous activity. Therefore, we mask the
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adjacent samples to force the neural network to model (or remember) the
“normal” EM signal patterns, rather than learning an interpolating func-
tion. In our proposed system, we mask 8 immediate past samples and 8
immediate future samples (i.e., k = 8), and after removing the immediate 8
samples, use the remaining 64 past and 64 future samples (i.e., d− k = 64)
as inputs as written in:
x(n) = [x(n− d), x(n− d+ 1), ..., x(n− k − 1),
x(n+ k + 1), ..., x(n+ d− 1), x(n+ d)]. (4.7)
It is important to mention that we found that without using masking,
the network performs poorly in detecting anomalies.
In the training phase, we collect EM signals by executing malware-free
applications on a reference device. We then extract a smaller window from
the recorded EM signal. The window consists of 2d+1 samples, out of which
2(d− k) samples are used as the input vector x(n), 1 sample is used as the
target output x(n), while 2k samples are masked. Thus, the window acts
as a training example (i.e., input and target output pair, (x(n), x(n))). We
then calculate the squared error, e(n), which is computed as the squared
difference between the predicted value, y(n), and the true or target output
value, x(n), using the given training pair.
e(n) = (y(n)− x(n))2. (4.8)
Next, we slide this window through the entire EM signal to get M training
examples by setting n = 1, 2, ...,M . We use Mean Squared Error (MSE) as
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Here, M is the number of training examples (i.e., the total number of
windows), which in our evaluations typically ranges between 2 to 5 mil-
lion samples. During training, the network parameters are optimized by
minimizing the loss function MSE through Stochastic Gradient Descent
(SGD) [108] optimization. Note that our Neural Network training is de-
signed such that it minimizes the average error, not the error for indi-
vidual prediction. The main reason is that during training, we observed
that individual samples can sometimes experience relatively large errors
due to temporary changes in EM signals caused by transient noise (e.g.,
EMI) and/or micro-architectural events (e.g., cache misses). However, the
overall behavior of the signal follows a deterministic pattern for a given
application. Thus as the MSE is minimized, the neural network learns
to model and predicts the EM signal more accurately (i.e., the prediction
error decreases on average).
4.3.4 Anomaly Detection
During the monitoring phase, the trained neural network model is de-
ployed to monitor a target device. The system continuously observes the
EM emanation from the device and extracts input and target output pair
(x(n), x(n)) from the EM signal. We use x(n) as test inputs to predict y(n),
and compute the squared prediction error e(n). When the target device
performs malicious or anomalous activity (i.e., any activity that the neu-
ral network was not trained with), it causes unexpected deviations in the
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Figure 4.6: Low-pass filtering and thresholding.
device’s EM signal. This, consequently, increases the network’s squared
prediction error e(n). We exploit this fluctuation in e(n) to detect malware
execution.
To avoid false positives due to transient noise or variations in hardware
activities, which could cause temporary large errors, we low-pass filter
the squared prediction error e(n) and apply thresholding to detect anoma-
lous program behavior. Figure 4.6 shows an example of how filtering and
thresholding can be helpful to avoid false positives while maintaining the
accuracy. We apply an 2N + 1 samples long Moving Average (MA) filter (as







This low pass filtering results into a bi-modal Probability Density Func-
tion (PDF) (as shown in Figure 4.7), where the squared prediction error ẽ(n)
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Figure 4.7: Threshold selection using PDF of squared prediction error for
normal and malicious program activity.
for normal and malicious program activity can be separated by a threshold
θ . Thus, we set a threshold θ on ẽ(n) between the two PDFs, and report
anomalous program activity whenever ẽ(n) > θ.
4.3.5 System Parameters
The performance of the detection system depends on a number of system
parameters, such as the length of the input vector D, the size of the mask
k, the moving average filter parameter N , and the threshold parameter θ.
In this section, we discuss how these parameters are chosen and their im-
pacts on the system performance.
Input Vector Length D: The EM signal represented by the input vector
provides a “context” for the prediction. More specifically, the Neural Net-
work exploits the past and the future EM patterns to predict the present
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EM amplitude. While a larger value for D increases the “context”, this also
adds to the complexity of the Neural Network and may lead to overfitting.
Thus, from empirical evaluation, we use D = 128.
Mask Size k: The adjacent samples of the EM signal are more corre-
lated at a higher sampling rate (i.e., with a lower time-gap between two
adjacent samples). Thus, intuitively the mask (or k) should be larger with
a higher sampling rate. However, a mask that is too large may overshadow
the “context”, and interfere with the prediction. We monitored FPGA, TS-
7250, and A13-OLinuXino with 10 MHz bandwidth (i.e., 5 MHz bandwidth
on either side of the clock frequency). Thus, we used the same mask (k =
8) throughout all experiments.
Moving Average Filter Parameter N: The moving average filter helps to
reduce false positives due to unpredictable variabilities in hardware activ-
ities (e.g., cache misses). These variabilities can cause transient yet high-
valued prediction errors. As such, the PDF of the squared error for nor-
mal activity resembles an exponential function with a long-tail (as shown
in Figure 4.8). This tail overlaps with the PDF of the malicious activ-
ity and consequently generates a lot of false positives. However, the MA
filter reduces the false positives by transforming the PDF into a symmet-
ric (Gaussian-like) function. With increasing N, the function gets sharper
with a shorter tail and results into fewer false positives (i.e., less overlap
with the PDF of the malicious activity). However, this reduction of the
false positives comes at the cost of increased detection latency. Further-
more, shorter malicious activities (e.g., intrusions that are shorter than N
samples) may go undetected. Thus, the optimal N is a trade-off between
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Figure 4.8: Probability Density Function of the squared prediction error
for normal program activity with and without moving average filter.
reliable detection (low false positives) and detection latency. In our experi-
ments, we used N = 64 for monitoring FPGA, and N = 1024 for monitoring
TS-7250 and A13-OLinuXino board. The higher order MA filter safeguards
against larger variations in the EM signal due to the unpredictable activi-
ties by the OS.
Threshold θ: The threshold θ helps to distinguish the malicious activi-
ties from the normal activities and is chosen using the PDF of the squared
prediction error. If the squared prediction error has a bi-modal and dis-
joint PDF for normal and malicious activity, we can achieve 100% detection
with zero false positive by setting the threshold θ between the two PDFs (as
in Figure 4.7). However, if the two PDFs overlap, the value of θ is a trade-
off between false positives and false negatives. A higher value of θ will
lead to lower false positives at the cost of higher false negatives, and vice
versa. Note that, in case of zero-day attacks, we don’t have prior knowl-
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edge about the PDF for the malicious activity. Thus, we set the threshold
θ slightly right to the tail of the PDF corresponding to the normal activity.
4.4 Experimental Evaluations
We evaluate the proposed system with several different types of malware
on different applications and embedded systems.
4.4.1 Embedded Device with Different Malware Behavior
We implement two types of embedded system malware payloads (DDoS
attacks, Ransomware attacks) and a code modification attack (similar to
Stuxnet) on an Altera DE-1 prototype board (Cyclone II FPGA with a 50
MHz NIOS II soft-processor). The DDoS attack exploits vulnerabilities
such as buffer-overflow to divert the control-flow to send DDoS packets
in rapid succession through the devices JTAG port. We also implement a
Cryptoviral Ransomware [94] that performs only a single (16-byte) block
encryption of AES-128. Intuitively, larger encryption should be easier to
detect. Finally, we evaluate a Code Modification attack where the source
code has been slightly modified. We added a small (about 10 instructions)
to the source code to mimic the behavior of Stuxnet-like malware where
the adversary modifies the code to change a critical value based on some
conditions.
We inject these malware behavior into three selected applications (Print
Tokens, Replace and Schedule) from SIR repository [93]. The system was
trained and tested with a disjoint set of user inputs (i.e., the training
and testing executions has different user inputs and thus, follow differ-
ent control-flow paths). Consequently, there were significant variations in
execution time for different inputs. For instance, in Replace, the shortest
69
execution lasts only 71 µs while the longest one is 4.58 ms. Likewise, in
Print Tokens, the shortest execution is 116 µs, and the longest execution
takes 10.8 ms. Similarly, for Schedule, the shortest execution is 48 µs and
the longest execution takes 12.2 ms. We used inputs (for both training and
testing) that provide high path coverage (using LLVM to find the paths).
For example, the Print Tokens application has 87 unique acyclic control-
flow branches, out of which 83 were executed by the test set. Likewise,
the Replace application has 96 unique acyclic control-flow branches, out
of which 74 were executed during testing. Similarly, the Schedule applica-
tion has 83 unique control-flow branches, and all of them were executed
by the test set.
The training and the cross-validation program executions were uncom-
promised (i.e., without malware), while the testing contained both compro-
mised and uncompromised program executions. For Print Tokens, we used
400 training, 45 cross-validation, and 192 testing executions, of which 66
had DDoS, 68 had ransomware, 8 had code modification, while 50 were
without malware. Likewise, for Replace, we used 458 training, 45 cross-
validation, and 188 testing executions. The testing set contained 65 DDoS,
68 Ransomware, 5 code modification malware, and the rest (i.e., 50) were
uncompromised. The Schedule benchmark had 284 training, 103 cross-
validation, and 294 testing examples. The testing set included 67 DDoS,
68 Ransomware, 9 code modification, and 150 executions were without
malware.
Figure 4.9 demonstrates our experimental setup. We monitor the device
executing these applications using a 2.4-2.5 GHz 18 dBi panel antenna
and demodulate the received EM signal using an Agilent MXA N9020A
spectrum analyzer. The demodulated signal is then filtered using an anti-
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Figure 4.9: Experimental setup of the malware detection system.
aliasing filter with 5 MHz bandwidth and finally sampled at 12.8 MHz sam-
pling rate. The Experimental results demonstrate that the mean squared
prediction error for the malicious (i.e., untrained) activity is significantly
higher than that of the normal (i.e., trained) activity. This is also shown
in Figure 4.7. While the neural network can successfully model and pre-
dict the EM signal for trained program activity with low prediction error,
the model fails for untrained program activity. As such, any execution of
anomalous program activity leads to deviations in the device’s EM ema-
nation, which in turn results in higher prediction error. Thus, the system
can differentiate between normal and anomalous program activity through
the neural network’s prediction error.
Table 4.1 demonstrates the performance of the proposed system for
detecting different malware activities on different applications. Results
show that the system can detect all DDoS and Ransomware without any
false positive (AUC = 1.0), and for code modification, the system achieves
roughly 0.99 AUC. It should be noted that the execution time for DDoS and
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Table 4.1: Detection performance for different malware behavior.
Area Under the Curve (AUC)
Application DDoS Ransomware Code Mod.
Print Tokens 1.0 1.0 1.0
Replace 1.0 1.0 0.99
Schedule 1.0 1.0 0.97
Ransomware is much larger (roughly 25 µs and 150 µs respectively) than
that of the code modification attack, which takes up only 5 µs. Hence, code
modification is stealthier and harder to detect.
We further evaluate the detection latency of the system. We use a non-
causal prediction model (i.e., the neural network exploits both past and
future samples to predict the present sample value). This causes a delay of
d = 72 samples (5.625 µs) in prediction. In addition, the moving average filter
introduces a delay of N = 64 samples (5 µs). Thus the total system delay
is d + N = 136 samples (10.625 µs). However, the detection latency will be
higher than the system delay due to the time taken for threshold breaching
by the anomalous EM pattern. The experimental mean detection latency
for DDoS, Ransomware, and code modification are presented in Table 4.2.
Both DDoS and code modification are detected in less than 13 µs while
Ransomware is detected in 22 µs. In comparison, [34] and [33] has latency
greater than 200 µs and 2000 µs respectively.
Table 4.2: Detection latency for different malware behavior.
DDoS Ransomware Code Mod.
Latency 12.5 µs 22.0 µs 12.5 µs
4.4.2 Robustness against Variations in Antenna Distance
To evaluate the robustness of the system, we trained and tested the sys-
tem by placing the antenna at different positions. It is reasonable to as-
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Table 4.3: Detection performance at different distances.
Area Under the Curve (AUC)
Distance DDoS Ransomware Code Mod.
1m 1.0 1.0 0.99
2m 1.0 1.0 0.99
3m 0.99 1.0 0.97
4m 0.96 0.94 0.71
sume that the system will be trained with a reference device and then
deployed to monitor a different target device. As such, the antenna place-
ment and positioning may vary between the training and the monitoring
phase. Thus, the detection system must be robust against variations in
antenna placements. To evaluate the robustness of the system, we first
trained the system from 1 m distance and then used this trained system
to monitor the target device from four different distances (1 m, 2 m, 3 m,
and 4 m). Table 4.3 shows that the system is robust against variations in
antenna distance. In addition, the system demonstrates excellent perfor-
mance from up to 3 m distance. Further distance causes some degradation
in system performance due to the lower Signal-to-Noise Ratio (SNR) at a
higher distance. Note that our framework is not limited by distance, and
higher distance coverage can be achieved by using higher gain antennas
(e.g., [109]).
4.4.3 Robustness against Noise and Interference
We further evaluate the robustness of the system against environmental
noise by applying Additive White Gaussian Noise (AWGN) to the monitored
signal. Any practical monitoring system should be able to detect security
threats under a potentially noisy environment. Thus, we evaluate the per-
formance of the detection system at different SNR by applying AWGN to
the monitored signal. Table 4.4 shows that the system is robust against
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Table 4.4: Detection performance at different Signal-to-Noise Ratio.
Area Under the Curve (AUC)
SNR DDoS Ransomware Code Mod.
30 dB 1.0 1.0 0.99
20 dB 1.0 1.0 0.98
10 dB 1.0 1.0 0.95
5 dB 0.85 0.95 0.71
noise and has an excellent detection performance even at an SNR as low
as 10 dB.
In addition, the system is inherently robust against any EM interference
outside its monitored bandwidth. As described in Section 2.3.2, the anti-
aliasing filter used during the analog-to-digital conversion nullifies any
signal with frequencies beyond fc ± B. Here, fc is the clock frequency
of the monitored device, and 2B is the monitored bandwidth. Thus, any
EM interference outside the monitored bandwidth does not influence the
detection performance.
4.4.4 Attack on IoT Device
We implement three different malicious activities (e.g., code injection, DDoS,
and Ransomware) on an IoT device (A13-OLinuXino board with 1 GHz Cor-
tex A8 ARM processor and Debian Linux OS). We inject these malicious
behavior into two selected applications (basic math and bit count) from
MiBENCH [110]. First, we implement a buffer overflow attack to inject
shellcode into the application. Next, we port a DDoS bot in a selected
location of the application. The DDoS bot sends 100 TCP SYN packets
and then resumes to normal program activity. Finally, we implement a
Ransomware prototype that performs AES 128 encryption.
We monitored the emanated EM signal with a small magnetic probe
placed 5 cm away from the system using a commercially available software-
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Table 4.5: Detection performance for monitoring IoT device.
Area Under the Curve (AUC)
Application Code Inj. DDoS Ransomware
Basic Math 1.0 1.0 1.0
Bit Count 1.0 1.0 1.0
defined radio (Ettus Research B200-mini) with a bandwidth of 40 MHz
centered at the clock frequency (1 GHz) of the device. The collected sig-
nal was then demodulated, digitized, down-sampled to 10 MHz sampling
rate, and finally processed through the proposed neural network frame-
work. For each application, we trained the system with 25 uncompromised
(malware-free) executions. Next, we test the system with 100 executions
(25 malware-free, 25 with code injection, 25 with DDoS, and 25 with Ran-
somware). Experimental evaluations (in Table 4.5) show that the system
detects all malicious activity without any false positive.
We used the same neural network architecture and parameters (e.g.,
D=128 and k = 8) throughout all experiments. However, we exploited a
higher order moving average filter (N=1024) to avoid false positives due
to transient activities by the OS. Consequently, the detection latency of
the system was higher (roughly 120 µs), which is still considerably lower
than [34] and [33] (200 µs and 2000 µs respectively). Note that, [33] used
a similar experimental setup (e.g., the same benchmark applications ex-
ecuted on the same device with similar code injection attacks). However,
[34] monitored a PLC - a simpler device (e.g., slower clock speed and does
not have an OS). Intuitively, it should be easier to model EM emanation
from a simpler device (e.g., in the absence of unpredictable OS activities),
and thus should lead to lower detection latency.
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4.4.5 Attack on Medical Cyber-Physical System
We further evaluate the system by implementing malicious attacks on a
medical CPS called SyringePump. A SyringePump is a medical device that
can dispense or withdraw a precise amount of fluid or medicine [111]. A
SyringePump has three main components, a syringe filled with medicine,
an actuator (typically a stepper motor), and a control unit that receives
user inputs and controls the actuator accordingly.
To evaluate the robustness of the proposed malware detection system,
we implement an Open Source SyringePump [112] with two different de-
vices:
1) TS-7250 Board (200 MHz Cirrus EP9302 ARM9 CPU with a Debian
Linux OS), and
2) A13-OLinuXino Single-Board-Computer (1 GHz ARM Cortex A8 proces-
sor with a Debian Linux OS).
We exploit a buffer overflow vulnerability in the serialRead() function
to hijack the control-flow and call MoveSyringe() function to dispense or
withdraw an unwanted amount of fluid. This is an example of a code-reuse
attack where the attacker repurposes existing code to perform unwanted
action. As the attacker executes existing code, albeit, in an undesired
way, a code-reuse attack can be harder to detect. Any failure to admin-
ister medication at an appropriate dosage can have serious consequences
for the patient. Thus, this attack poses a critical threat to the integrity of
the SyringePump. For monitoring, we place a small magnetic probe 5 cm
away from the system and record and demodulate the signal using a com-
mercially available software-defined radio (Ettus Research B200-mini).
We train the system with 25 executions and test it with 50 executions,
out of which half were compromised with malware. Experimental results
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Table 4.6: Detection performance for monitoring SyringePump.
TS-7250 Board A13-OLinuXino
AUC 1.0 1.0
(in Table 4.6) show that the system achieves excellent performance and
detects all malicious activity without any false positive.
4.5 Summary
In this chapter, we presented a novel framework for malware detection in
critical and high-assurance embedded and cyber-physical systems using
EM side-channel signal analysis. The system models device’s EM ema-
nation with a multilayer perceptron (MLP) and detects anomalous or ma-
licious program activity through deviations in the EM fingerprint. The
system is trained with EM signal from an uncompromised reference device
and can predict EM emanation for normal (i.e., trained) program activ-
ity. However, whenever the monitored device performs any malicious (i.e.,
untrained) program activity, the trained neural network model fails and
results in high prediction error. We then detect this deviation in predic-
tion error and report anomalous activity. The system does not require any
knowledge about the nature of the attack or its malware signature, thus
ensures protection against zero-day attacks. In addition, the system can
provide non-intrusive and remote monitoring (without any physical access
to the device), and does not require any modification to the monitored sys-
tem. Neither does it impose any overhead on the monitored device. The
detection system can train its model by observing the device’s EM emana-
tion and does not require any access to the source code or the control-flow
graph of the monitored system. We demonstrated the effectiveness of the
system with several key malware behavior (DDoS, Ransomware, and Code
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Modification), which the system could detect with excellent accuracy (AUC
≈ 0.99) from up to 4 m away. The system was also able to detect attacks
on an IoT device and a medical CPS with 100% accuracy.
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CHAPTER 5
PROGRAM TRACING THROUGH ELECTROMAGNETIC SIDE-CHANNEL
ANALYSIS
5.1 Overview
In this chapter, we present P-TESLA (Program-Tracing through Electro-
magnetic Side-channeL Analysis), a novel framework for zero-overhead
program execution tracing. P-TESLA leverages the device’s electromag-
netic (EM) side-channel signals for basic-block-granularity program exe-
cution tracing. P-TESLA is completely non-invasive and does not require
any resource or any modification of the monitored device. Thus, P-TESLA
is especially suitable for monitoring resource-constrained devices such as
embedded devices and the Internet of Things (IoT) devices.
To reconstruct program execution traces, P-TESLA has to overcome the
following challenges: 1) train a signal emanation model that associates
signal patterns (or signatures) with code segments or subpaths, and 2)
represent the test signal using such signal patterns to reconstruct the pro-
gram execution path. Specifically, we use a two-step training process that
exploits instrumented training to annotate the uninstrumented training
signals, and identify which signal snippets correspond to which code seg-
ments. We also propose a novel signal matching technique that efficiently
establishes a correspondence between the test signal and the training sig-
nals, and exploit this signal correspondence to reconstruct the program
execution path.
The main contributions of this chapter are:
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• P-TESLA - a novel framework for zero-overhead and non-intrusive
program tracing.
• A training process that exploits instrumented executions to annotate
uninstrumented training signals.
• An efficient signal matching algorithm that establishes a correspon-
dence between the training and the test signals, and reconstructs the
execution path based on the signal correspondence.
• Empirical evaluations that demonstrate that (1) P-TESLA achieves
high accuracy and the predicted timestamps are highly precise (2)
P-TESLA can monitor devices with fast processors and operating sys-
tems, and (3) P-TESLA is able to monitor devices from 1 m distance.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows: Section 5.2 details our
framework for program execution tracing, Section 5.3 presents the experi-
mental evaluations, and finally, Section 5.4 presents the summary.
5.2 Program-Tracing through Electromagnetic Side-ChanneL Analysis
P-TESLA provides non-intrusive and zero-overhead program tracing by
monitoring the EM side-channel signal. A high-level overview of P-TESLA
is demonstrated in Figure 5.1. In the training phase, P-TESLA first exe-
cutes an instrumented version of the program and records the correspond-
ing EM emanations. The instrumented program also outputs a marker
sequence and their execution timestamps that indicate the program exe-
cution path. P-TESLA next executes an uninstrumented (unaltered) pro-
gram with the same program input and compares the uninstrumented EM
signal with the instrumented EM signal to map the uninstrumented sig-
nal fragments to the underlying program subpaths. We call this mapping
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Figure 5.1: Overview of the P-TESLA framework.
Virtual Marker Annotation, as it mimics the markers, however, without any
code instrumentation. This process exploits the fact that given the same
program input, the instrumented and the uninstrumented programs follow
the same program path, and thus follow the same marker sequence. This
process also exploits instrumented markers and timestamps for efficient
and precise signal mapping. Next, in the testing phase, P-TESLA mon-
itors the EM side-channel signal caused by the execution of the vanilla
(i.e., uninstrumented and unaltered) version of the program. P-TESLA
then matches the test signal with the training signals, and exploits vir-
tual markers to reconstruct the program execution path. In the following
sections, we explain the different steps of P-TESLA in detail.
5.2.1 Signal Preprocessing: Amplitude Demodulation
To monitor the program execution, P-TESLA first receives the emanated
EM signal through an antenna, performs amplitude demodulation of the
received signal, and then digitizes the demodulated analog signal using an
analog-to-digital converter. The digitized signal is next scale normalized
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before any further signal analysis. These preprocessing steps are applied
to both training and testing phases.
Researchers have demonstrated that embedded devices emanate am-
plitude modulated signals at the device’s clock frequency [89, 88]. At each
processor cycle, the CPU executes instructions, and thus, changes the
states of its internal digital circuits (i.e., switches on and off). This causes
an instruction dependent current at the CPU clock frequency. Here, the
CPU clock acts as the carrier, whose amplitude (i.e., the pulse shape) is
modulated by the variations of the executed instructions [113]. As this
current flows within the processor, and through the device’s printed circuit
board (PCB), the device acts as an unintentional and inefficient antenna
and emanates amplitude modulated EM signal [91]. Thus, to monitor pro-
gram execution, we demodulate the received signal r(t) at the CPU clock
frequency fc.
xa(t) = |r(t)× ej2πfct| (5.1)
Here, xa(t) is the amplitude demodulated analog signal and t denotes the
time. The demodulated signal xa(t) is then passed through an anti-aliasing
filter with bandwidth B, and sampled at a sampling period Ts.
xd(n) = xa(nTs) (5.2)
Here, xd(n) denotes the sampled signal at sample index n. The anti-aliasing
filter cancels unwanted signals with frequencies beyond fc ± B. Note that,
the sampling period Ts is determined by the well known Nyquist criterion
1
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Scale normalization ensures that the system is robust against changes in
amplitude of the EM signals (e.g., due to changes in the antenna’s dis-
tance, position, etc.). The scale normalized signal x(n) is then used for
further signal analysis by P-TESLA in the training and the testing phases.
5.2.2 Instrumented Training
P-TESLA is first trained with instrumented program executions and their
corresponding EM emanations. We execute an instrumented version of
the program, in which the source code is instrumented by inserting mark-
ers (i.e., special probe functions) at selected program locations. Each
marker has a unique identification number (ID) that identifies its posi-
tion in the program’s control-flow-graph (CFG). The marker function exe-
cution records the marker ID along with the execution timestamp. Thus,
the markers perform as program execution checkpoints that partition the
CFG into smaller code-segments, which we refer to as marker-to-marker
code-segments or subpaths.
We insert these markers in strategic program locations. The marker
insertion is dictated by the following criteria: (1) any program execution
control-flow path must be uniquely and unambiguously represented by
a sequence of marker-to-marker subpaths, and (2) all marker-to-marker
subpaths must be acyclic and intra-procedural. Based on these criteria,
we inserted markers in the following code locations: entry and exit nodes
of functions, loop heads, and target nodes of go-to statements.
CFG partitioning helps to provide training coverage for program exe-
cution. Specifically, any practical program has a large number of feasible
program execution paths. In fact, due to cyclic paths in the CFG, programs
can have an infinite number of unique execution paths. Hence, it is neither
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practical nor possible to provide training for all unique execution paths for
any practical program. However, the markers enable us to represent any
execution path as a concatenation of marker-to-marker subpaths. Thus,
instead of providing training for all unique execution paths, we provide
training that covers all marker-to-marker subpaths. Note that the num-
ber of marker-to-marker subpaths is limited and can be exercised using a
relatively fewer number of strategic executions.
The markers also enable us to annotate the monitored EM signal. The
marker execution timestamps help to establish a correspondence between
executed code segments (i.e., marker-to-marker subpaths) and the sig-
nal fragments they generate. It is important to emphasize that while the
markers provide an abstract partitioning, the program execution (for both
training and testing) follows a single contiguous trace (from the program’s
start to end), and generates a continuous EM signal. Consequently, it
is not visually identifiable that which marker-to-marker subpath gener-
ated which part of the emanated signal. So, we use the marker execution
timestamps to annotate the start and the end of each marker-to-marker
subpath in the monitored EM signal.
At the beginning of the program execution, we reset the processor’s
Time Stamp Counter (TSC ) to zero. The markers record the TSC values
as timestamps, which then indicate the time-interval (in clock-cycles) from






Here, n indicates the sample-index corresponding to the timestamp t, fs is
the sampling rate of the monitored signal, and fc is the clock frequency of
the monitored CPU. The rounding operation ensures that the resultant n
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Figure 5.2: Automatic detection of program’s start: the end of the periodic
pattern (for-loop) indicates the program’s start. We identify this when the
moving average of the EM signal drops below the threshold.
is an integer value.
We also identify the program’s start (i.e., sample-index n = 0) in the
signal. To facilitate the automatic detection of the program’s start (demon-
strated in Figure 5.2), we insert a for-loop just before the beginning of
the program execution. The for-loop executes a repetitive activity (e.g., in-
crements a loop counter variable) and generates a periodic and identifiable
signal pattern. The end of this periodic pattern indicates the end of the for-
loop (i.e., the start of the program). Furthermore, at the beginning of the
program execution, the program is loaded into the system memory. This
leads to memory access, which in turn stalls the processor and causes a
dip in the signal amplitude [81]. We identify this transition (from the end of
for-loop to the beginning of program execution) when the moving median
of the signal drops below a predefined threshold (as shown in Figure 5.2).
This acts as the reference point (i.e., sample-index n = 0). All markers are
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Figure 5.3: Markers (vertical red lines) are placed on the signal according
to their execution timestamps. The signal snippet between two consecutive
markers corresponds to the EM emanation from the marker-to-marker
code-segment.
then annotated according to their sample-indices.
Figure 5.3 demonstrates an annotated instrumented signal with each
marker represented by a vertical red line. Markers m0, m1, m2, and m3
are placed at sample-index n0, n1, n2, and n3 respectively. The marker
ID sequence (e.g., m0, m1, m2, . . . ) indicates the program execution path,
while execution timestamps or sample-index sequence (e.g., n0, n1, n2, . . . )
identifies the start/end of the marker-to-marker code-segments. Thus,
marker annotation establishes a correspondence between code-segments
and emanated EM signal snippets. For instance, in Figure 5.3, the signal
snippet between sample-index n0 and n1 corresponds to the execution of
the code-segment or subpath between marker m0 and m1.
While the instrumented training helps us to partition the CFG and to
annotate the signal, the instrumentation alters the original signal emana-
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Figure 5.4: EM signals corresponding to marker function execution.
tion patterns. Thus, the instrumented training signals and corresponding
signal emanation models cannot be used in the testing phase, in which
the device executes a vanilla version (i.e., unaltered and uninstrumented)
program. Specifically, the instrumentation adds overheads to the original
program (i.e., function calls that record marker ID and execution time-
stamps). The execution of these overhead codes (i.e., marker functions)
requires additional computation (and computational time), and in turn,
causes extraneous EM emanations that are irrelevant to the original pro-
gram.
To evaluate the impact of instrumentation, we investigate the EM sig-
nature of the marker functions. We identify the marker functions in the
instrumented signal using their timestamps. We then crop out and com-
pare these signal snippets. Figure 5.4 overlays 100 signal snippets corre-
sponding to the marker function execution. We observe that the marker
functions emanate very similar signal patterns. This is expected as the
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marker functions execute the same code segment. However, the begin-
ning and the end of the marker signals demonstrate a marked variability.
This is due to the microprocessor’s instruction pipeline architecture that
overlaps multiple instructions during execution. Thus, the processor’s EM
emanation at any instance depends on all instructions that are moving
through different stages of the pipeline, rather than just one single inst-
ruction. Consequently, the execution of the same marker function may
demonstrate signal variability towards the beginning and the end of the
function call depending on the variations in the preceding and the follow-
ing code segments (i.e., other instructions in the pipeline).
Likewise, the marker functions themselves also affect the EM emana-
tions of the adjacent code segments. In the instrumented execution, all
marker-to-marker code-segments are separated by marker functions. As
such, the EM emanation patterns from the code-segments are altered at
the boundaries due to the “cross-over” effect from the marker functions.
For larger code segments (e.g., consisting of a few hundred instructions),
the duration of the emanated signal is much larger compared to the al-
tered boundaries. Thus, the impact of instrumentation is trivial. However,
for smaller code segments such as basic blocks consisting of only a few
instructions, instrumentation can alter the overall signal emanation pat-
tern significantly. Thus, cropping out the marker signal-snippets from
the instrumented signals would not replicate the uninstrumented signals.




P-TESLA is next trained with uninstrumented program executions. How-
ever, before we can use the uninstrumented training for program execution
monitoring, we must first annotate the signal. Unlike the instrumented
executions, the uninstrumented executions do not have markers or time-
stamps. Thus, we cannot directly annotate or identify which signal snippet
corresponds to which code segment. Instead, we compare uninstrumented
execution with the instrumented execution to identify and demarcate the
marker-to-marker code segments in the signal. We call these demarcations
“virtual markers” as they play the same role as the marker functions, al-
beit, without adding any overhead code or altering the original program or
its signal emanation patterns.
Virtual Marker Annotation: In the instrumented execution, code seg-
ments are separated by marker functions. Each marker function execu-
tion records a pair of information m and t, where m represents the marker
ID that indicates the execution point in the CFG, and t is the execution
timestamp. We then convert the timestamp t to its equivalent sample-
index n (using equation 5.4). If the program executes k marker-to-marker
code-segments, the instrumented execution records a sequence of k + 1
markers (including the starting and the ending markers). Thus, instru-
mented execution outputs a maker ID sequence M = {m0,m1,m2, ...,mk}
and corresponding sample-index sequence N = {n0, n1, n2, ..., nk}, with M
uniquely identifying the program execution path, and N indicating which
signal snippet corresponds to which code segment. Thus, the task of vir-
tual marker annotation is to generate marker ID sequence M ′ and sample-
index sequence N ′ for the uninsrumented training signal, without actually
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Figure 5.5: EM signals corresponding to the uninstrumented (top) and
the instrumented (bottom) program executions. The dotted lines indicate
the correspondence between the uninstrumented and the instrumented
signal.
using instrumentation or marker functions.
To annotate the virtual markers, we execute the instrumented and the
uninstrumented programs with the same input. Thus, the executions
follow identical paths through the CFG (i.e., execute the same marker-
to-marker code segments in the same order). This ensures the marker
ID sequence is identical for instrumented and uninstrumented executions
(i.e., M ′ = M ). However, due to the overhead computations (i.e., marker
functions), the timestamps or sample-indices for the virtual markers are
significantly different (i.e., N ′ 6= N ).
To estimate the virtual marker sample-index sequence N ′, we compare
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the uninstrumented and instrumented EM signals (Figure 5.5). We no-
tice that the execution of the same code segment (e.g., m0-m1-m2) requires
more computational time in the instrumented version due to the marker
function overheads. Thus, we estimate the sample-indices for the virtual




i−1 + (ni − ni−1 − noh) for i ∈ {1, . . . , k} (5.5)
Here, n′i−1 and n
′
i indicate the sample-indices for the (i− 1)-th and i-th vir-
tual marker in the uninstrumented signal, ni−1 and ni indicate the sample-
indices for the (i−1)-th and i-th marker in the instrumented signal, and noh
is the overhead computational time (in samples) for the marker function.
Thus, (ni−ni−1−noh) is the overhead-subtracted execution time for the i-th
code segment. Note that, sample-index n′0 = 0 (indicating the starting point
of the program), and we iteratively estimate n′1, n
′
2, . . . , n
′
k.
While Equation 5.5 gives a good initial estimation for the virtual marker
annotation, it does not account for the execution-to-execution hardware
variabilities such as cache hits or misses that may lead to variabilities in
computational time. To mitigate this issue, we fine-tune the initial sample-
index estimations by matching the uninstrumented signal with its instru-
mented counterpart. First, we identify the signal snippet corresponding
to a given code segment in the instrumented signal using its timestamps.
Let x(n) be the instrumented signal with n indicating its sample-index.
Thus, the signal snippet between sample index n = ni−1 and n = ni corre-
sponds to the i-th code segment (i.e., the subpath between markers mi−1
and mi). We then exclude or crop-out the first noh samples from this sig-
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Algorithm 1: Virtual marker annotation.
Input: x(n), y(n′), N = {n1, n2, . . . , nk}
Output: N ′ = {n′1, n′2, . . . , n′k}
initialization: set n′0 = 0;
for i := 1 to k do
Estimate n′i (Eq. 5.5);
Find best match (Eq. 5.6);
Update n′i (Eq. 5.7);
nal snippet as they correspond to the marker function not the original
code segment. In Figure 5.5, the dotted lines indicate the correspon-
dence between the uninstrumented and instrumented signals. Thus, this
overhead-subtracted signal snippet si(n) acts as the EM signature or tem-
plate for the code segment. We search for this signal template by sliding
it across the uninstrumented signal y(n′). We limit our search within ±d
samples of the initial estimations (i.e., between sample-index n′ = n′i−1 − d
to n′ = n′i + d). This makes the search computationally efficient, and also
helps to avoid false signal matches. At each search position, we compute
the Euclidean distance between the template and the uninstrumented sig-




e(l) for l ∈ [−d, d] (5.6)
Here, e(l) is the Euclidean distance between the template si(n) and the
uninstrumented signal y(n′), and l indicates the shift from the initial esti-
mated n′i. Thus, l̂ is the shift corresponding to the best match. Finally, we
update initial estimated n′i using the following equation.
n′i := n
′
i + l̂ (5.7)
This iterative process is depicted in Algorithm 1.
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5.2.4 Program Execution Monitoring
To reconstruct the program execution path, P-TESLA compares the de-
vice’s EM emanation with the (uninstrumented) training signals and pre-
dicts the control-flow execution path. The path prediction involves two
steps. In step 1, we match the monitored signal with the training signals
to establish a signal correspondence. In step 2, we exploit this signal cor-
respondence to predict the program execution path by using the training
signal annotations (i.e., the virtual markers). We discuss these steps with
further details in the following paragraphs.
Signal Matching: To establish a signal correspondence, we match fixed-
length windows from the monitored signal against the training signals,
and then adjust the window-size according to the signal similarities. The
signal matching process is demonstrated in Figure 5.6. First, we extract a
fixed-length initial window W of size L from the monitored signal. We then
slide W across all training signals to find the best (i.e., the least Euclidean
distance) match. This establishes a window-to-window signal correspon-
dence (shown with a dashed arrow in Figure 5.6). Next, we compare the
samples that follow these windows. In Figure 5.6, the initial window and
its subsequent samples are overlaid on the matched window and its sub-
sequent samples using red dots. We then iteratively extend the signal
correspondence as long as the overlaid monitored signal is similar to the
underlying training signal. Specifically, in each iteration, we compare the
D subsequent samples and compute the sample-to-sample squared differ-
ence. If the mean squared difference is below a predefined threshold θ, we
update the matched window size: L := L+D, and keep comparing the next
D samples. Otherwise, we terminate the window extension process. We
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Figure 5.6: Signal matching process: the dashed arrow indicates the cor-
respondence between fixed-length windows in monitored and training sig-
nals. Window size is extended based on signal similarities, up to the point
where the training signal (blue line) starts to deviate significantly from the
monitored signal (overlaid red dots).
then again extract the next unmatched window from the monitored sig-
nal, match it across all training signals, and adjust the window-size. This
process goes on until we establish signal correspondence for the entire
monitored signal.
This approach for signal matching is computationally more efficient
than that of multiscale signal matching, in which multiple windows of
different sizes are simultaneously matched against the training signals.
In contrast, we initiate the search using a small fixed-sized window, and
then gradually extend the window size. Furthermore, the time complexity
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(a) Control-flow graph (b) Program execution path reconstruction using signal
correspondence.
Figure 5.7: Execution path reconstruction exploiting signal correspon-
dence between training and test signals.
for the window search is directly proportional to the window size L. Thus,
a smaller window leads to a faster search. However, if the window is too
small, the match becomes unreliable. Therefore, in our experiments, we
choose L = 64. In addition, smaller values for D enable finer adjustment
of the window size. However, too small a value for D may lead to early
termination of the window extension due to a few noisy samples. In our
experiments, we use D = 8.
Path Reconstruction: We next exploit the correspondence between the
monitored and the training signals to reconstruct the execution path. Fig-
ure 5.7 demonstrates the path reconstruction process with a simplified
example. On the left (Figure 5.7a), we have the program CFG where
the nodes represent the markers, and the edges represent the marker-
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to-marker subpaths. The training signals and the monitored signal are
shown on the right (Figure 5.7b). The (virtual) markers are annotated on
the training signals with vertical black lines and indicate that training sig-
nal 1 corresponds to the program path Start − A − C − A − C − End, while
training signal 2 corresponds to Start−A−B−End. Note that, for this simple
CFG, these two training executions are sufficient to provide coverage for
all marker-to-marker subpaths (i.e., edges on the graph). However, most
applications often require a large number of executions (e.g., hundreds or
even thousands) for high code coverage.
Furthermore, we indicate the correspondence between the monitored
and the training signals using color-matched windows and dashed ar-
rows. For instance, the red windows in the training and the monitored
signals demonstrate similar signal patterns, and so do the green windows.
This signal correspondence enables us to reconstruct the monitored sig-
nal by concatenating matched-windows (e.g., red and green windows) from
different training signals. More importantly, the signal similarity or cor-
respondence implies that the matched windows correspond to the same
program subpath. Thus, we reconstruct the program execution path for
the monitored signal by concatenating the program subpaths correspond-
ing to the matched training windows. For instance, the red window (in
training signal 1) corresponds to the program subpath Start − A − C − A,
and the green window (in training signal 2) corresponds to the program
subpath A−B −End. Therefore, we concatenate these subpaths to recon-
struct the execution path. In Figure 5.7, the reconstructed execution path
(Start− A− C − A−B − End) is indicated with dashed vertical lines.
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5.3 Experimental Evaluations
We evaluate P-TESLA by monitoring two different devices executing three
different benchmark applications. The evaluation metrics, the benchmark
applications, and the experimental results are discussed in the following
sections.
5.3.1 Evaluation Metrics
To evaluate P-TESLA, we compute the edit distance between the actual
execution path and the reconstructed execution path. Specifically, we
use Levenshtein distance [114] that computes the minimum number of
edits (insertions, deletions, or substitutions) required to change the re-
constructed marker sequence to the actual marker sequence. We then
compute the path reconstruction accuracy using the following equation.
Accuracy = 1− Edit Distance
Length of Actual Marker Sequence
(5.8)
We further compare the actual and the reconstructed timestamps. Specif-
ically, we compute and report the absolute timing difference between the
actual and the reconstructed markers. Note that, the edits are excluded
from this comparison, as there is no timestamp for the edited (e.g., inserted
or deleted) markers.
5.3.2 Benchmark Applications
We selected 3 benchmark applications (Print Tokens, Replace, and Sched-
ule) from the SIR repository [93]. These applications are commonly used
to evaluate techniques that analyze program execution. The size matrix
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Table 5.1: Benchmark applications statistics.
Benchmark LOC Basic Blocks
Print Tokens 464 178
Replace 495 245
Schedule 579 175
for the benchmark applications is shown in Table 5.1.
Moreover, these applications have many inputs, each taking a unique
execution path through the CFG. We used disjoint sets of inputs for train-
ing and testing. For each application, we randomly selected 500 inputs for
training, and 100 for testing. Table 5.2 summarizes training-testing split.
Table 5.2: Training and testing executions.
Benchmark Training Testing
Print Tokens 500 100
Replace 500 100
Schedule 500 100
We evaluate P-TESLA by executing these applications on two different
devices: 1) FPGA device and 2) IoT device.
5.3.3 FPGA Device Monitoring
First, we monitored an Altera DE-1 prototype (Cyclone II FPGA) board.
This device has a 50 MHz NIOS II soft-processor. We placed a magnetic
probe near the device to collect the EM side-channel signal. We then used
an Agilent MXA N9020A spectrum analyzer to observe and demodulate
the EM emanations. The demodulated signal is next passed through an
anti-aliasing filter with 5 MHz bandwidth. Finally, we sampled the filtered
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Figure 5.8: Experimental setup: monitoring from 1 m distance.
signal at 12.8 MHz sampling rate, and analyzed the digitized signal using
P-TESLA.
Table 5.3: Mean accuracy for FPGA.




Table 5.3 summarizes the mean accuracy. We observe that P-TESLA
achieves excellent accuracy for monitoring all three benchmark applica-
tions, with roughly 99% accuracy for Print Tokens and Replace, and near-
99
perfect accuracy for Schedule.
Table 5.4: Mean timing difference for FPGA.
Benchmark Mean Timing Difference
Print Tokens 0.98 samples
Replace 4.13 samples
Schedule 0.88 samples
We also report the mean timing difference of the predicted timestamps
in Table 5.4. For Print Tokens and Schedule the mean timing difference
is less than 1 sample. However, for Replace, the mean timing difference
is roughly 4 samples. Note that, at the experimental sampling rate (12.8
MHz), 1 sample is equivalent to 78.125 ns. Thus, all timing estimations are
very precise.
Monitoring from Distance: We further evaluate P-TESLA by monitoring the
FPGA device from 1 m distance using a panel antenna. Figure 5.8 shows
the experimental setup. We summarize the mean accuracy in Table 5.5.
P-TESLA achieves better than 95% accuracy on all three benchmarks. In
fact, for Print Tokens and Schedule, P-TESLA achieves roughly 99% accu-
racy.
Table 5.5: Mean accuracy at 1 m distance.





Table 5.6: Mean timing difference at 1 m distance.
Benchmark Mean Timing Difference
Print Tokens 3.78 samples
Replace 5.56 samples
Schedule 1.32 samples
Table 5.6 shows the mean timing difference for the predicted marker
timestamps. While the timing differences are slightly higher than that of
with probe, predicted timestamps are still very precise, and within a few
samples.
While P-TESLA demonstrates excellent performance from 1 m distance,
we notice slight degradation in accuracy compared to that of with probe
(i.e., at 1 cm distance). This degradation is due to the lower SNR at dis-
tance, and can be improved by using high-gain antennas and/or low-noise
amplifiers.
5.3.4 IoT Device Monitoring
We demonstrate the robustness of P-TESLA by monitoring an A13-OLinuXino
IoT development board. This device has a 1 GHz Cortex A8 ARM processor
[115]. Unlike the FPGA device, A13-OLinuXino runs on a Debian Linux
operating system. We collected the EM side-channel signal by placing a
magnetic probe near the microprocessor. The signal was recorded and
demodulated using a spectrum analyzer (Agilent MXA N9020A). We then
digitized the signal by passing it through an anti-aliasing filter with 20 MHz
bandwidth, and sampling at 51.2 MHz sampling rate.
Table 5.7 shows the accuracy of P-TESLA for monitoring the IoT de-
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Table 5.7: Mean accuracy for IoT device.




vice. P-TESLA demonstrates high accuracy on all three benchmark appli-
cations; 94.15% on Print Tokens, 96.85% on Replace, and 95.91% on Schedule.
Note that, P-TESLA achieves even higher accuracy (roughly 99%) for moni-
toring FPGA device. However, A13-OLinuXino has a much faster processor
(1 GHz compared to FPGA’s 50 MHz), which makes fine-grained execu-
tion monitoring more challenging. Furthermore, the operating system on
A13-OLinuXino leads to more variations between training and testing ex-
ecutions. This, in turn, can cause performance degradation. As such,
P-TESLA’s performance on monitoring the IoT device is impressive.
Table 5.8: Mean timing difference for IoT device.
Benchmark Mean Timing Difference
Print Tokens 7.68 samples
Replace 10.33 samples
Schedule 6.92 samples
Furthermore, the timing differences reported in Table 5.8 demonstrate
that P-TESLA predicted timestamps are also quite precise. The mean tim-
ing difference for all three benchmark applications is within 10 samples.
Note that, in our experiments (at 51.2 MHz sampling rate), each sample is
equivalent to 19.5 ns.
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Monitoring from Distance: We also evaluate P-TESLA by monitoring the IoT
device from distance. For this, we placed a slot antenna at 1 m distance
from the device.
Table 5.9: Mean accuracy at 1 m distance.




Table 5.9 shows that P-TESLA achieves roughly 90% mean accuracy on
all three benchmarks. Furthermore, Table 5.10 reports the mean timing
difference. We also notice some performance degradation at distance. This
is due to lower SNR that affects the signal matching adversely.
Table 5.10: Mean timing difference at 1 m distance.
Benchmark Mean Timing Difference




In this chapter, we presented P-TESLA, an approach for program execution
tracing via EM side-channel signals. P-TESLA is completely non-invasive
and does not impose any overhead on the monitored system. P-TESLA
is especially useful for monitoring resource-constrained embedded devices
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for tasks such as program debugging and anomalous/malicious program
activity detection.
Experimental evaluations revealed that P-TESLA can provide highly ac-
curate program traces for benchmark applications running on different
embedded devices, even from 1 m away. Future research should focus on
extending P-TESLA’s capability by enhancing its signal processing tech-




IMPACTS OF SIGNAL QUALITY ON SIDE-CHANNEL ANALYSIS
6.1 Overview
Side-channels are often used in cryptanalysis to extract secret crypto-
graphic keys, and more recently, for non-adversarial and non-intrusive
program execution monitoring. Both these use cases have seen steady
improvements, allowing ever-smaller differences in program behavior to
be detected via side-channel analysis. However, it is still unclear where
the limits for side-channel analysis are, e.g. whether a deviation of just a
few instructions (or even a single instruction) in program execution can be
identified from the side-channel signal, and how these limits depend on the
rate at which the signal is observed (i.e., signal bandwidth), the amount of
training that is available, and the quality of the signal (i.e., signal-to-noise
ratio).
In this chapter, we investigate the practical limits of side-channel ana-
lysis. We demonstrate that given enough training data, sufficient signal
bandwidth, high signal-to-noise ratio (SNR), and prior knowledge about
the program code itself, even a single-instruction difference in the program
execution can be identified with very high accuracy. For this, we monitor
a popular open-source cryptographic software package (OpenSSL’s sliding
window modular exponentiation) via EM side-channel. Experimental eval-
uations demonstrate that each branch decision in the program execution
can be recovered through the EM side-channel with high accuracy, using
bandwidth and SNR that is easily provided by a sub-$1,000 equipment.
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The main contributions of the chapter are:
• We demonstrate that branching decisions with even a single instruc-
tion deviation can be identified via EM side-channel analysis. Conse-
quently, (1) detailed and accurate program execution tracking should
be possible, and (2) secret-key-dependent branching should be avoided.
• We also show that large deviations in the program execution can be
identified with >90% accuracy with a relatively narrow signal band-
width (e.g., at a rate that is only 2% of the monitored system’s clock
cycle rate). However, identifying tiny deviations, such as a single inst-
ruction branching, requires a much faster signal rate (e.g., 8% or 16%
of the monitored system’s clock cycle rate). We further demonstrate
that accurate program execution monitoring requires a relatively good
signal quality (e.g., an SNR of 20 dB or higher).
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 6.2 describes
the OpenSSL’s sliding window modular exponentiation, Section 6.3 presents
our method for side-channel-based branch decision prediction, Section 6.4
details experimental results, and Section 6.5 provides the summary.
6.2 Monitored Software - Modular Exponentiation in OpenSSL
We use an open-source implementation of the RSA public-key cryptosys-
tem as a test subject to investigate the capacity/limitations of side-channels
for identifying branching decisions in the program execution. Specifically,
we try to recover the secret key bits from OpenSSL’s sliding window mod-
ular exponentiation (function BN_mod_exp_simple from bn_exp.c in the
OpenSSL source code) via EM side-channel analysis. This choice of soft-
ware test subject has several key advantages. First, RSA’s modular ex-
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ponentiation has already been subjected to numerous side-channel at-
tacks, so each branching decision (a decision to either continue to the
next instruction in the program or jump to another instruction in the pro-
gram) in its program code is extremely well understood. Second, many
branching decisions depend on the bits of the secret exponent in RSA
decryption, so our experimental results are directly relevant for cryptanal-
ysis. Finally, the implementation already contains mitigation for previ-
ously demonstrated side-channel attacks, so the individual (secret-key-
dependent) differences in program execution are very small and largely
independent of each other, so our identification of each small difference in
execution is not aided by signal changes caused by other correlated dif-
ferences. The listing below shows the main part of this code, with some
redaction (mainly removal of error checking) to enhance clarity:
1 wvalue = 0; /∗ The ’ value ’ of the window ∗/
2 wstart = bits − 1; /∗ The top b i t of the window ∗/
3 wend = 0; /∗ The bottom b i t of the window ∗/
4 BN_one ( r ) ;
5 for ( ; ; ) {
6 i f ( BN_is_bit_set (p , wstart ) == 0) {
7 BN_mod_mul( r , r , r , m, ctx ) ;





13 /∗ We now have wstart on a ’ set ’ b i t , we now need to work out
14 how big of a window to do . To do th is we need to scan forward
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15 unt i l the last set b i t before the end of the window ∗/
16 j = wstart ;
17 wvalue = 1;
18 wend = 0;
19 for ( i = 1; i < window; i ++) {
20 i f ( wstart − i < 0)
21 break ;
22 i f ( BN_is_bit_set (p , wstart − i ) ) {
23 wvalue <<= ( i − wend ) ;
24 wvalue |= 1;




29 /∗ wend is the size of the current window ∗/
30 j = wend + 1;
31 for ( i = 0; i < j ; i ++)
32 BN_mod_mul( r , r , r , m, ctx ) ;
33
34 /∗ wvalue wi l l be an odd number < 2^window ∗/
35 BN_mod_mul( r , r , val [ wvalue >> 1] , m, ctx ) ;
36
37 /∗ move the ’window ’ down further ∗/
38 wstart −= wend + 1;
39 wvalue = 0;




This program code computes vp mod m, where v is the (encrypted) mes-
sage, p is the (secret) exponent, and m is the modulus. Conceptually,
it follows the grade-school exponentiation approach, where the exponent
is examined starting from the most significant bit, squaring the result for
each bit of the exponent, and multiplying the result with the message when
the bit of the exponent has a value of one. However, rather than process
one bit of the exponent at a time, the sliding window algorithm splits the
exponent into multi-bit chunks called windows and performs multiplica-
tion with the (appropriately pre-exponentiated) message an entire window
at a time. In preparation for this, for each possible value of the window
(wvalue), the value of vwvalue mod m has been pre-computed and placed in
the table val at an index that corresponds to wvalue.
Initially, the very first window starts with a value of 0 (line 1), its most
significant bit is the most significant bit of the exponent (line 2), and the
window contains one bit from the exponent (line 3, note that the value of
wend is always one less than the number of bits in the window). Like the
message and the exponent, the result r is a very large number (>1,000 bits)
that is kept in a data structure that contains an array of 32-bit integers,
so function BN_one sets the large number to a value of 1. The main loop
of the exponentiation begins (line 5), and in each iteration of this a window
is formed and the result is updated for that window. In this algorithm, a
multi-bit window must begin and end with a non-zero bit. Therefore, line
6 examines the exponent’s bit at the starting position of the window. If
that bit is zero, that bit alone will be a (zero-valued) window. This means
that the result should be squared (line 7) but no multiplication with the
message is needed, so a new window will begin at the next bit position
(line 10) and a new iteration of the main loop is begun (line 11). Note that,
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if the bit that was just examined was the last (least significant) bit of the
exponent (line 8), the entire exponentiation is now complete (line 9).
If the starting bit of the window is not zero, the code at lines 16 through
27 attempts to form a multi-bit window. Since the non-zero bit begins the
window, the value of the window is now 1 (line 17), and the loop at line
19 iterates over the bits that are examined for potential inclusion into the
window. Variable i is the number of bits that have been examined, and it
starts at 1 because the very first (most significant) bit of the window has
already been examined (and found to be 1). Line 20 checks if the would-
be window would go past the last (least significant) bit of the exponent,
in which case the window cannot be expanded further (line 21). Line 22
examines the next candidate bit. Since a window cannot end with a 0-
valued bit, a 0-valued bit is simply skipped without expanding the window.
However, a 1-valued bit causes the window to be expanded to include that
bit, as well as all the zero-valued bits between it and the rest of the window.
This is done by shifting the wvalue by enough bit positions to make room
for the bits that are being included (line 23), setting the least significant
bit of wvalue to 1 (line 24) because the new least significant bit of the
window is 1 – note that the other bits that are being included into the
window are all zero-valued, otherwise they would have been included when
they were encountered – and setting wend (line 25) to the new size of the
window. The loop at line 19 ends when the number of bits examined
for the current window reaches the maximum size allowed for a window.
Variable window stores this maximum size, and it is relatively small (5 or
6 for typical RSA key sizes) so that the table val (that contains a large
number for every possible value of the window) is still small enough to fit
in the processor’s data cache (which is good for performance). Not every
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window has the maximum size - the window’s size depends on when a
one-valued bit was last included. For example, if the maximum window
size is 6 (i.e., window = 6), when the bits examined for the window are
100000, the window only has one bit (the initial 1), when the examined
bits are 110000 the window has only two bits (11), when the examined
bits 111000 or 101000 the resulting window has 3 bits (111 or 101), etc.
Once the window is formed, the result is squared for each bit in the
window (lines 30-32) and then multiplied (line 35) with the value from
table val that was pre-computed by exponentiating the message with the
value of the window. Finally, wstart and wvalue are updated to begin a new
window (lines 38 and 39), and another iteration of the main loop begins
to form another window. The exception to this is when the just-processed
window included the last bit of the exponent, in which case the entire
exponentiation is complete (lines 40 and 41).
In prior cryptanalysis work, a cache-based attack [116, 117] was used
to identify the sequence of squaring and multiplications, while for ana-
log side channels the squaring and multiplications were identified in the
signal by using especially chosen messages [69, 5] that create a large dif-
ference in their side-channel signals. Since each squaring corresponds to
moving one bit toward the least significant bit of the exponent, and the
multiplication corresponds to the end of a non-zero window, the sequence
of squaring and multiplications reveals the position of each 1-valued bit
that ends a window. Furthermore, when the number of squaring between
two multiplications is less than the maximum allowed size of the win-
dow, that indicates the number of zero-valued bits that follow the last bit
that was included in the window. By iteratively applying such exponent-
reconstruction rules to the sequence of squaring and multiplications, a
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significant percentage of the exponent’s bits were recovered - 49% of the
bits when the maximum window size is 4, and this percentage of recovered
bits declines somewhat when the maximum window size is larger.
To avoid these attacks that rely on an exponent-dependent sequence
of squaring and multiplications, OpenSSL has switched to a fixed-window
exponentiation, where all windows are of the same size and all possible
values of the window (including the all-zeros window) are represented in
the pre-computed table val. This results in multiplications that are al-
ways separated by an equal number of squaring, regardless of the expo-
nent. Furthermore, because every bit up to the window size is included
in the window, there are no branch decisions that depend on the bits
of the exponent - in fact, the sequence of all branch decisions is always
the same for the entire exponentiation, regardless of the exponent. The
listing below shows the main part of the exponentiation code (in func-
tion BN_mod_exp_mont_consttime within the bn_exp.c file in OpenSSL’s
source code), again with some redaction (mainly removing error-checking)
for clarity:
1 while ( bits >= 0) {
2 wvalue = 0; /∗ The ’ value ’ of the window ∗/
3 /∗ Scan the window, squaring the resul t as we go ∗/
4 for ( i = 0; i < window; i ++, bits−−) {
5 BN_mod_mul_montgomery(&tmp, &tmp, &tmp, mont, ctx ) ;
6 wvalue = ( wvalue << 1) + BN_is_bit_set (p , bits ) ;
7 }
8 /∗ Fetch the appropriate pre−computed value from the pre−buf ∗/
9 MOD_EXP_CTIME_COPY_FROM_PREBUF(&am, top , powerbuf , wvalue ,window ) ;
10 /∗ Multiply the resul t in to the intermediate resul t ∗/
11 BN_mod_mul_montgomery(&tmp, &tmp, &am, mont, ctx ) ; }
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This code uses the more efficient Montgomery multiplication algorithm
(BN_mod_mul_montgomery) that improves resilience to cache-based side-
channel attacks using a more complicated organization of the lookup table
(the variable that refers to it is named powerbuf in this code, rather than
val) that requires a specialized function MOD_EXP_CTIME_COPY_FROM_PREBUF
to retrieve the table entry that corresponds to wvalue and place it into am
so it can be multiplied with the result.
Because the existing branch decisions in this code leak no information
about the exponent, we change the code so that line 6 is replaced by
1 wvalue = ( wvalue << 1)
2 i f ( BN_is_bit_set (p , bits ) )
3 wvalue|=1;
Note that this introduces an exponent-dependent branch decision which
creates a single-instruction difference in program execution, so it will allow
us to experimentally assess how accurately a single-instruction difference
in execution can be identified from the side-channel signal.
6.3 Side-Channel-Based Branch Decision Prediction
The branching decision prediction method consists of two phases: the
training phase and the prediction phase. In the training phase, we learn
the EM signatures corresponding to each branch decision by executing
encryption with known keys. In the prediction phase, we use the learned
EM signatures from training to predict which branch decision is the best
match for the EM signal observed during prediction. In both cases, we
need to capture and pre-process the signals before running our prediction
algorithm.
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6.3.1 Acquisition of Modulated EM Signals
Unintentional EM emanations occur at various frequencies, but of particu-
lar importance is the frequency band centered around the clock frequency
of the device’s processor and memory. This frequency band contains sig-
nals that are primarily a function of the instruction sequence executed by
the CPU. Each processor cycle, the CPU draws a current that is a direct
result of the executed instruction(s). Much of this instruction-dependent
current is drawn by the CPU clock circuitry and by the circuitry that per-
forms new computations (i.e., switches on and off) every CPU clock cy-
cle. This creates a strong current at the CPU clock frequency, which acts
as a carrier modulated by the clock-cycle-to-clock-cycle variations in pro-
gram activity (i.e., executed instructions). When its EM signal is observed
this way, the computer system has much in common with a communica-
tions system: the processor is a transmitter which (inefficiently and un-
intentionally) transmits a carrier (i.e., the clock signal) that is amplitude-
modulated by a program’s activity as it causes activity in the processor’s
circuitry. We can then receive and demodulate this signal using wireless
communications techniques. All EM signals, both in the training phase
and in the monitoring phase, are first AM demodulated at the processor
clock frequency, low-pass filtered and sampled before being sent for signal
processing.
6.3.2 Signal Processing
The first step in both training and testing is to identify the location where
either control-flow branching or window value calculation takes place in
the received signal. Since the modular multiplication of large numbers
(functions BN_mod_mul and BN_mod_mul_montgomery) has a fixed sequence
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Figure 6.1: The EM signature of BN_mod_mul_montgomery function.
of branch decisions and is thus of no interest for our experiments. We find
the signature of this multiplication and identify the part of its signal that
has a prominent and abrupt change in the signal (see Figure 6.1). Because
modular multiplication was designed to have almost no timing variation,
the end of the signal that corresponds to it can be found at a fixed time
offset from the point of this match. The signal that we use for training and
prediction of exponent-dependent branches consists of the snippets of the
signal between each ending of a modular multiplication and the beginning
of the next one.
6.3.3 Training Phase
In the training phase, we execute encryption with known keys, select the
snippets of the signal between modular multiplications, and use them to
create a “dictionary" of reference EM patterns for each possible combina-
tion of branch outcomes within the code the snippet corresponds to. We
first label each snippet according to which modular multiplications it has
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Figure 6.2: Labeling of the signal snippets for sliding-window exponentia-
tion.
at its beginning and its end and treat these snippets as transitions in a
state machine whose states are the modular multiplications as shown in
Figure 6.2. In addition to this, the transition from state A to state B (which
corresponds to examining the candidate bits for a non-zero window) has
32 different sub-labels that correspond to all possible combinations of out-
comes for the five branch outcomes that examine on the candidate bits.
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Since training is performed with known exponents, the labels for all the
snippets collected during training are also known, so the output of the
training is a “dictionary” that contains a large number of labeled signal
snippets.
6.3.4 Prediction Phase
During the detection phase, just like in training, we first identify and ex-
tract the snippets of the signal that correspond to execution between mod-
ular multiplications. Then, for each snippet encountered in the detection
phase, we use the 1-Nearest Neighbor (1-NN) algorithm, with Euclidean
distance as the distance metric, to find which snippet in the dictionary is
the closest match for that detection-phase snippet, and use the label of
that dictionary snippet to label the detection-time snippet.
6.4 Experimental Evaluations
6.4.1 Experimental Setup
We run the OpenSSL’s RSA decryption on an embedded device (A13 OLin-
uXino board [115]). The A13- OLinuXino board is a single-board computer
that has an in-order 2-issue Cortex A8 ARM processor [118], and it uses
the Debian Linux operating system.
Signals are received using a small magnetic probe. We place the probe
close to the monitored system as shown in Figure 6.3. The signals col-
lected by the probe are recorded with Keysight N9020A MXA spectrum an-
alyzer [119]. Our decision to use a spectrum analyzer was mainly driven
by its existing features such as built-in support for automating measure-
ments, saving and analyzing measured results, visualizing the signals
when debugging code, etc. We have observed very similar signals when
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Figure 6.3: Experimental setup.
using less expensive equipment such as Ettus USRP B200-mini receiver
[95]. The analysis was implemented in MATLAB and executed on a per-
sonal computer, takes less than one minute to reconstruct the exponent-
dependent branch decisions encountered in one 1024-bit modular expo-
nentiation.
6.4.2 Impact of Signal Bandwidth on Branch Decision Reconstruction
The branch decisions we are interested in are the exponent-dependent
branches in the sliding window implementation and in the modified fixed
window implementation. These can be clustered into three categories:
First, branches at lines 8 and 37 in the sliding-window implementa-
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tion result in relatively large changes in what is executed after them. The
branch at line 8 results in either calling BN_mod_mul at line 9, or in exe-
cuting the entire window-forming loop (lines 22-33), followed by lines 36
and 37 before BN_mod_mul is entered at line 38. The loop branch at line 37
results in either calling BN_mod_mul at line 38, or in exiting the loop, call-
ing BN_mod_mul at line 41, and then executing the code at lines 43-47 and
entering another iteration of the main exponentiation loop. Compared to
the branch at line 8, the outcome of this branch is more difficult to iden-
tify using the side channel signal because the long-lasting BN_mod_mul
is called almost immediately after this branch, regardless of its outcome,
and the largest difference that results from its outcome occurs only after
BN_mod_mul returns.
Second, the branch at line 28 in the sliding window implementation
results in either executing the code at lines 29-31, which consists of only
four processor instructions, or not executing these four instructions. After
that, the two options converge.
Finally, the exponent-dependent branch in our modified fixed-window
implementation creates only a single-instruction (a bitwise OR instruction)
difference in what is executed by the processor.
Figure 6.4 shows the accuracy of identifying (reconstructing) branch
decisions for these three kinds of branches, when the signal is received us-
ing 20 MHz, 30 MHz, 40 MHz, 80 MHz, and 160 MHz of bandwidth. Note
that the processor clock frequency is 1 GHz, so these bandwidth values
correspond to only 2%, 3%, 4%, 8%, and 16% of the processor’s clock fre-
quency. From these results, we can see that branch decisions which cre-
ate large changes in subsequent program execution can be reconstructed
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Figure 6.4: Accuracy of side-channel-based reconstruction of branch de-
cisions (vertical axis) for different values of the received signal bandwidth
(horizontal axis).
that cause 4-instructions and single-instruction changes in program exe-
cution, some reconstruction is possible even when using bandwidth that
is only 2% of the processor’s clock frequency, but reconstruction accuracy
significantly improves when bandwidth is increased to 4% of the clock fre-
quency, and then modestly improves as bandwidth is expanded to 8% and
then 16% of the processor’s clock frequency. However, we found it surpris-
ing that reconstructing accuracy for 1-instruction differences in our mod-
ified fixed-window implementation was consistently better than the recon-
struction accuracy for 4-instruction differences in the sliding-window im-
plementation. Upon further investigation, we have found that, in addition
to signal bandwidth and the amount of execution change, the accuracy of
branch decision reconstruction also depends on how much is known about
the branches that belong to the same signal “snippet” during analysis. In
the fixed-window implementation, the outcomes of all branch decisions in
the signal “snippet” are already known (because the entire exponentiation
follows a fixed sequence of branch decisions), so only one bit of informa-
tion is extracted from the signal “snippet”, i.e. the reconstruction decision
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must choose between only two possibilities. In contrast, in the sliding-
window implementation, five exponent-dependent branches occur in the
same signal “snippet”, so five bits of information must be extracted from
the signal “snippet”, i.e. the reconstruction decision is a choice among 32
possibilities.
Our results for reconstruction of branch decisions that cause large
changes in program execution are an improvement over the prior state of
the art in analog side-channel cryptanalysis [69, 5] in at least two signifi-
cant ways. That prior work [69, 5] relies on specially crafted messages (a
chosen-cyphertext attack) that cause signals for a squaring (result-result
multiplication) and a (result-message) multiplication to differ significantly,
which allows the sequence of squaring and multiplication operations to be
recognized in the sliding-window implementation, and then some bits of
the key can be recovered from the squaring-multiplication sequence. The
first advantage of our approach, when used for cryptanalysis, is that it
works for any message, and in fact, requires no knowledge of the message
at all. The second cryptanalysis advantage of our approach is that, instead
of distinguishing between squaring and multiplication operations, it recon-
structs the exponent-dependent branch decisions (branches at lines 8 and
37 in the sliding-window code) that decide not only whether a squaring or
multiplication should be executed next, but also which squaring operation
follows - the one used for a single-bit zero-valued window (line 9) or the
one for a non-zero window (line 38). This allows recovery of more of the
exponent’s bits – we discover at which bit-position each non-zero window
begins and ends, and also at which bit positions all the single-bit zero-
valued windows are, so the only bits left unknown are those between the
leading 1 and the trailing 1 in each non-zero window. The effect of this is
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that where prior work was able to recover 49% of the exponent’s bits when
the maximum window size was 4 (and fewer bits when the maximum win-
dow size is larger), in our experiments the maximum window size was 6
and yet 55% of the exponent’s bits are recovered using reconstruction of
branch decision of only the large-change branches (those at lines 8 and 37
in the sliding-window program listing).
Furthermore, successful reconstruction of branch decisions that cause
4-instruction changes in program execution would recover all of the expo-
nent’s bits. Our experiments show that, when the received signal’s band-
width is 4% or more of the clock frequency, these 4-instruction-change
branch decisions are recovered with >90% accuracy, and that accuracy
exceeds 95% when using 16% bandwidth, and this alone allows recovery
of 90% to 95% of the exponent’s bits, far more than in prior work. Finally,
note that information gained from the reconstruction of large-change and
4-instruction-change decisions can be combined, leading to the recovery of
84% of the exponent’s bits even with 2% bandwidth, 95% with 4% band-
width, and 98% with 16% bandwidth. For side-channel-based program
monitoring, this implies that knowledge of how the branch decisions in
the program are related to each other can be used to improve the overall
accuracy of tracking the program at basic-block granularity.
Finally, our results for 1-instruction-change branches in the modi-
fied fixed-window implementation further imply that any key-dependent
branching should be avoided in cryptographic implementations, and that
side-channel-based program monitoring with single-instruction granular-
ity is possible, for at least some parts of the code.
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6.4.3 Impact of Training on Branch Decision Reconstruction
Another important factor in both cryptanalysis and side-channel based
execution monitoring is how much training is needed to achieve a desired
level of accuracy, and how the accuracy improves as more or less train-
ing is available. To help answer this question, we focus on the branch
that causes a 4-instruction change in the sliding-window exponentiation
(the branch at line 28). The results of this study are shown in Figure 6.5,
for signals received with a bandwidth of 160 MHz (16% of the processor’s
clock frequency). The smallest amount of training we use consists of only
one exponentiation, but since 2048-bit RSA decryption uses two 1024-bit
exponents, even a single (1024-bit) exponent results in 130 to 140 sig-
nal “snippets” that correspond to window-forming loop (lines 25-33 in the
sliding-window listing). Recall that for each such signal “snippet” the re-
construction decision has 25 = 32 possible outcomes because each snippet
contains 5 execution instances of the branch at line 28, so each 1024-bit
exponentiation used in training on average provides slightly more than 4
signal snippets for each of these possibilities.
We observe that training with only 4 examples for each distinct 5-
branch reconstruction possibility results in 62% reconstruction accuracy,
which is not very accurate but is noticeably more than the 50% accuracy
that would result from a purely random reconstruction. The accuracy
dramatically improves with more training, reaching 86% when 85 training
examples for each 5-branch reconstruction possibility, 95% when 1028
training examples per reconstruction possibility are available, and the im-
provement in accuracy continues, albeit more slowly, as even more train-
ing examples are added.
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Figure 6.5: Accuracy of side-channel-based reconstruction of branch de-
cisions (vertical axis) when changing the number of training examples for
that point in the program code (horizontal axis, note the logarithmic scale).
even the rightmost data point in Figure 6.5 corresponds to using only
250 RSA decryptions (with known keys) for training, and this training
can be accomplished in only a few minutes and the entire “dictionary”
produced by training occupies only a few tens of megabytes of memory.
For side-channel-based program monitoring, however, these results imply
that training may possibly need to contain hundreds of signal examples
for each point in the code, which is likely to create two kinds of problems.
First, in any given application, some parts of the program are very rarely
executed, so it may be hard to rapidly obtain enough signal examples for
those parts of the code. Second, for very large software, hundreds of signal
examples for each fine-grained part of the code, with possibly millions of
such points in the code, would require an enormous memory/disk foot-
print to store all of the training data that is needed to monitor such an
application. This means that significant further research may be needed


















Figure 6.6: Accuracy of side-channel-based reconstruction of branch de-
cisions (vertical axis) when changing the SNR (horizontal axis in decibels
(dB), which implies a logarithmic scale).
6.4.4 Impact of SNR on Branch Decision Reconstruction
Our results shown thus far use the signal collected in very close prox-
imity (about 2 cm) of the monitored system, where the Signal-to-Noise
Ratio (SNR) is about 30 dB, i.e. the power of the received signal is about
1,000 times the power of the received noise. To study how the SNR of
the side channel signal affects the reconstruction of branch decisions, we
perform additional experiments where we reduce the SNR to 20 dB (sig-
nal has 100 times the power of the noise), 10 dB (signal has 10 times
the power of the noise), and 5 dB (signal has only 3.2 times the power of
the noise). We again use 160 MHz of bandwidth, and in Figure 6.6 show
results for each of the three categories of branches – large-change and 4-
instruction-change branches from the sliding-window exponentiation, and
the 1-instruction-change branches from our modified fixed-window imple-
mentation.
From these results, we observe that a relatively low SNR (5 dB) still al-
lows highly accurate (98%) reconstruction of branch decisions that cause
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large changes in program execution, while the reconstruction of small-
change branch decisions is only somewhat better (than pure random guess-
ing (50%)). Increasing the SNR to 10 dB and then to 20 dB brings the large-
change branch decisions very close to perfect reconstruction accuracy,
and also dramatically improves reconstruction for small-change branch
decisions, which at 20 dB SNR can be reconstructed with >90% accuracy.
Finally, increasing the SNR to 30 dB has little impact on the (already close-
to-perfect) reconstruction accuracy for large-change branch decisions, but
does improve reconstruction accuracy for small-change branch decisions,
which are not reconstructed with >95% accuracy.
For cryptographic implementations, these results imply that branch de-
cisions that lead to large changes in what is subsequently executed would
not be based on key material should, because that allows key material
to be recovered through side-channel signals even when they are received
with low SNR, i.e., from larger distances or in the presence of some noise-
generating and/or shielding countermeasures. Accurate reconstruction of
branch decisions that result in changing the program execution by only
one or a few instructions, however, does require a reasonably good SNR (at
least 20 dB), so countermeasures that dramatically reduce the SNR of the
signal may be effective.
For side-channel-based monitoring of program execution, these results
imply that significant changes in program execution, e.g., tracking which
coarse-grained part of the program is executed or detecting long bursts of
anomalous execution, can use signals received with relatively low SNR, but
fine-grained (instruction-level) tracking of program execution and/or de-
tection of small divergences from normal execution requires good-quality
(at least 20 dB SNR).
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6.5 Summary
In this chapter, we investigate how the decisions of branches (i.e., the
control-flow decisions) in the program execution can be recovered (recon-
structed) by monitoring side-channel signals. For this, we use a popu-
lar open-source cryptographic software (RSA OpenSSL) as a test subject
and evaluate how the accuracy of the control-flow reconstruction depends
on the signal’s received bandwidth, the amount of training data, and the
signal-to-noise ratio. Our results indicate that, with reasonable signal
bandwidth, enough training, and a good signal-to-noise ratio, even single
instruction differences in the program control flow can be recovered from
the electromagnetic (EM) emanations. We also observe that branch deci-
sions that result in coarse-grained changes in the program execution can
be reconstructed even using signals that have relatively low bandwidth
and SNR. Consequently, to protect against side-channel attacks, branch
decisions that consider fine-grained parts (e.g., individual bits) of the cryp-
tographic key should be avoided, especially when these branch decisions
result in coarse-grained changes in the subsequent execution. Our results
also imply that side-channel-based non-adversarial monitoring of the pro-
gram execution (e.g., to obtain runtime performance information or detect
anomalies) is possible using signals collected with reasonable and compact
equipment, e.g., sub-$1,000 receivers that provide >40 MHz of bandwidth
and compact probes placed a few centimeters from the monitored system.
However, monitoring of large applications requires enough training for the
rarely-executed parts of the application.
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CHAPTER 7
RESEARCH CONTRIBUTIONS AND FUTURE WORK
7.1 Research Contributions
This research proposed to leverage side-channels for non-adversarial and
non-intrusive monitoring of embedded and cyber-physical systems. We
demonstrated that EM side-channel signal analysis can be an effective
way for protecting resource-constrained security-critical embedded devices
from stealthy intrusions and malicious attacks. We also designed a frame-
work for detailed (basic-block granularity) program execution tracing ex-
ploiting the device’s EM side-channel signal. Furthermore, we showed that
given enough training data, wide monitoring bandwidth, and high signal-
to-noise ratio, even a single instruction deviation in the program execution
can be detected with high accuracy through EM side-channel analysis.
The techniques proposed in this thesis provide solutions for identifying
deviations in the device’s EM side-channel signals for anomaly-based in-
trusion/malware detection and for establishing a correspondence between
training and testing signals for detailed program execution tracing. The
main research contributions of this thesis are:
1. We have designed an anomaly-based intrusion detection system called
IDEA (Intrusion Detection through Electromagnetic signal Analysis)
[48]. In the training phase, IDEA creates a dictionary of trusted EM
signatures by monitoring a reference device. IDEA is next deployed
to monitor a target device. IDEA monitors and compares the device’s
EM emanations to the reference EM signatures, and reports intru-
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sion when deviations in EM side-channel signal are detected. IDEA
can effectively monitor and protect different embedded devices (FP-
GAs, IoTs, CPSs, etc.) against stealthy intrusions with high detection
accuracy (AUC ≈ 0.99) from distances up to 3 m.
2. We have designed a neural network to model the device’s EM side-
channel signal and detect malicious activities in embedded devices
through identifying deviations in EM emanations [49]. The malware
detection system trains with EM signals from an uncompromised or
‘malware-free’ reference device to model normal program activity. We
then exploit this trained model to monitor EM emanations from tar-
get devices. When the device performs anomalous/malicious activity,
the device’s EM side-channel signal violates the learned signal model.
This, in turn, increases the neural network’s prediction error, which
we detect and report as anomalous/malicious activity. The system
can detect even stealthy (e.g., 5 µs long) malicious attacks with high
accuracy (AUC ≈ 0.99) and low detection latency (≈ 20 µs) from dis-
tances up to 3 m. Note that, while its detection performance is com-
parable to IDEA [48], the system is roughly 35 times faster and 375
times memory efficient than that of the IDEA framework.
3. We have designed a novel framework called P-TESLA (Program-Tracing
through Electromagnetic Side-channeL Analysis) [50] that leverages
the device’s EM side-channel signals for zero-overhead and non-intrusive
program execution tracing. P-TESLA has a two-step training process
in which the instrumented training facilitates to annotate the unin-
strumented training signals and establish a correspondence between
code segments (i.e., basic blocks) and signal snippets. Furthermore,
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P-TESLA exploits a novel signal matching technique that efficiently
matches the test signal with the training signals to reconstruct the
program execution path. P-TESLA can effectively monitor different
embedded devices (e.g., FPGAs and IoTs) and reconstruct detailed
(basic-block granularity) program execution traces with high ( ≈ 99%)
accuracy from up to 1 m distance.
4. We have demonstrated that even a single instruction deviation in
the program execution can be detected with high accuracy via EM
side-channel signal analysis. However, to successfully monitor fine-
grained program activity, the monitoring system requires sufficient
signal bandwidth (e.g., roughly 8% to 16% of the monitored system’s
clock speed), enough training data (e.g., nearly 100% code-coverage),
adequate signal-to-noise ratio (e.g., 20 dB or higher), and prior knowl-
edge about the program code and its vulnerabilities. Note that such
monitoring bandwidth and SNR can be achieved by a relatively cheap
(e.g., a sub-$1,000) equipment. Thus, we have concluded that EM
side-channel based non-adversarial program execution monitoring
is very much feasible. We have also demonstrated that branching
decisions in the program execution are easily identifiable in side-
channel attacks, and thus, any secret-key-dependent branching de-
cision should be avoided.
7.2 Future Research Directions
Although this thesis provides techniques that leverage side-channels to
monitor embedded devices, our techniques, in their current settings, do
not monitor multiple devices simultaneously. Thus, future research should
focus on extending these techniques to monitor multiple devices using a
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single monitoring system (i.e., with a single antenna and a single receiver).
This would significantly reduce the deployment cost, making the monitor-
ing system more suitable for commercial deployment.
Another interesting direction for research is cross-device side-channel
analysis. Existing side-channel analysis techniques require device-specific
training (i.e., separate and unrelated training for each device-class). How-
ever, researchers have demonstrated that different devices behave sim-
ilarly (and emanate similar side-channel signals) while executing simi-
lar program activities. For instance, periodic activities, such as program
loops, cause periodic signals (in both EM and power side-channels) with
loop-specific spectral spikes, regardless of the device-class. Similarly, in
all devices, the last-level cache misses in program execution cause dips in
the monitored side-channel signal amplitude. This indicates that cross-
device side-channel analysis is feasible and training from one device-class
can be exploited for analyzing a different device-class. Therefore, develop-
ing a cross-device side-channel analysis platform could reduce the training
time or the data collection time significantly.
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backscattering side channel to enable detection of dormant hard-
ware trojans,” IEEE transactions on very large scale integration (VLSI)
systems, vol. 27, no. 7, pp. 1561–1574, 2019.
[85] L. N. Nguyen, “Hardware trojan detection using the backscattering
side channel,” 2020.
[86] L. N. Nguyen, C.-L. Cheng, F. T. Werner, M. Prvulovic, and A. Zajic,
“A comparison of backscattering, em, and power side-channels and
their performance in detecting software and hardware intrusions,”
Journal of Hardware and Systems Security, pp. 1–16, 2020.
[87] L. N. Nguyen, B. B. Yilmaz, C.-L. Cheng, M. Prvulovic, and A. Za-
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